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 Campaign finance laws were passed with the intent to prevent large sums of money from 
entering the electoral system. However, each time Congress passed campaign finance reforms, the 
Supreme Court struck them down the basis they violated the First Amendment. In the Supreme 
Court cases that followed, Buckley V. Valeo (510 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and Citizens United 
V. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the Court ruled money is a 
form of speech used during an election cycle, thus deserves constitutional protections. Likewise,  
the Supreme Court allowed interest groups to favor an electoral oriented donation strategy where 
they win seats by donating large sums of money to their preferred candidate. Instead of lobbying 
for legislation at the federal level, interest groups will elect their preferred candidate into office by 
donating large sums of money to win the seat.   
Citizens United permitted an interest group to run independent expenditure ads funded by 
the interest group’s general treasury fund that explicitly advocated for their preferred candidate. 
By the same token, to win the seat interest groups run independent advertisements on behalf of 
their candidate of choice. These independent expenditure advertisements, as a result of Citizens 
United, appear on tv up and till Election Day. Furthermore, these independent expenditure 
advertisements polarize the electorate by reinforcing the voters already held beliefs about a 
candidate and policy issue, thus moving the electorate to opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
Lastly, Citizens United allowed organizations called, “501 c (4),” social welfare organizations to 
donate to candidates without disclosing how and where they are receiving their funds. These 501 
c (4)’s that donate, but hide to whom and where they are giving their money to are called, “dark 
money groups.”  Moreover, these “501 c (4)’s,” can give money to interest groups who will run 
issue advertisements on behalf of the dark money group. When dark money groups spend money 




on issue advertisements without disclosing their donors, this causes a decrease of transparent 
political information during an election cycle.  
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These three thesis chapters explore three different aspects of Campaign Finance Reform 
in the United States. One, how interest groups use two strategies to either elect their preferred 
candidate into office or pass legislation at the federal level; an electoral oriented or access-
oriented donation strategy.  Two, how lax campaign finance laws have allowed interest groups to 
increase spending on issue advertisements causing a polarized electorate. Three, curtailed 
campaign finance laws allowed dark money groups to reduce transparency of political 
information causing negative and deceptive political advertisements to increase.  
Campaign finance reform has evolved and changed from 1976 with the passage of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (Pub.L. 93-443), to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (Pub.L. 107 – 155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 2356) to 2010 with the 
Supreme Court case, Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010). The electoral process in the United States ideally is supposed to be open and 
accessible to those who are eligible to vote, regardless of income. Moreover, campaign finance 
laws ensure citizens of the United States are able to vote, receive unbiased information, and have 
a voice in the political process regardless if they can donate or not.  
Unfortunately, this has not been the case because the Supreme Court has struck down 
important provisions of numerous campaign finance laws aimed at reducing the power of the 
wealthy in the electoral process. The Supreme Court struck down these provisions on the basis 
they violate an individual’s right to express their political opinion. By striking down important 
provisions the Supreme Court prioritized a wealthy corporation’s right to participate in the 




political process over a non – affluent voter’s constitutional right to participate in the political 
process.  
 This essay utilizes a variety of case studies to demonstrate how curtailed campaign 
finance laws have favored wealthy corporations above the interests of the  electorate in the 
political process. Moreover, curtailed campaign finance laws contribute to polarization within 
the electorate and decrease transparency of political information. Furthermore, this essay uses 
contribution reports, compiled by the Federal Election Commission and Open Secrets Center for 
Responsive Politics from 2012 Presidential Election, 2016 Presidential Election, 2008 
Presidential Election, and 2018 Midterm Elections. To conclude, this analysis  compares and 
contrasts contribution reports from 2012, 2008, 2016, and 2018, and found as campaign spending 
increases, interest groups favor an electoral oriented donation strategy, polarization within the 
electorate increases, and transparency of political information decreases.  
 The right to vote in the United States is codified in the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The Fifteenth Amendment, “prohibits the federal government and 
each state from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizens race, color or previous 
conditions of servitude.”1 Although this protected the right to vote for African Americans who 
were barred from voting in the United States, states still passed laws restricting access to the 
electoral process for African Americans and other minorities. These voting restrictions were in 
the form of literacy tests, a poll tax (a tax charged for voting in local elections), harassment, 
intimidation, and physical harassment. As a result, voter turnout and participation rates amongst 
whites increased, but decreased amongst African Americans and other minorities. In response to 
                                                      
1 The Constitution of the United States of America, The Declaration of Independence, “Fifteenth Amendment: 
Passed by Congress February 26, 1869, ratified February 3, 1870, Castle Books, New York, (published 2014), pg. 
57.  




these voting restrictions, the President at the time, Lindon B Johnson passed the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited literacy 
tests, required a Federal Examiner to register voters, and jurisdictions with a high minority 
population asking to change their voting practices or procedures, were required to obtain, “pre - 
clearance,” from the District Court for the District of Colombia.2  
This “pre - clearance provision,” was challenged in the Supreme Court Case Shelby 
County V. Holder (570 U.S. 529 (2013). Shelby County, Alabama wanted to change their voting 
procedures to favor the Republican voting base.3 The Alabama Black Caucus sued, stating 
Alabama violated the pre – clearance provision of the Voting Rights Act.4 The Supreme Court 
ruled, the pre – clearance provision of the Voting Rights Act imposed burdens that are no longer, 
“responsive,” to the current conditions in voting districts in question.5 The Court further ruled, 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional because the, “blatant discrimination 
against certain voters that Section 5 was intended to prohibit is no longer evident.”6 
Unfortunately, voter discrimination is still evident in the political process, but has taken a new 
form.  
Combined with voter ID laws, long lines at the polls, and purging voter rolls, wealth 
inequalities have become the current form of voter discrimination. Meaning, candidates running 
for office have an incentive to solicit money from voters who can donate the most money to their 
campaign. In exchange, the candidate running for office will caters to the interests of the voters 
who donated the most. By the same token, these voters tend to be wealthy and white, which does 
                                                      
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965 Public Law 89 – 110, 89th Congress of the United States, 1st Session, August 6, 1965, 
found on Our Documents.org, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=100#  
3 Shelby County v. Holder. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved July 6, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.  
4 Shelby County v. Holder. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved July 6, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.  
5 Shelby County v. Holder. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved July 6, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.  
6 Shelby County v. Holder. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved July 6, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.  
 




not mimic the majority of the electorate. This relationship has been primarily between the 
individual and the candidate. However, recently this relationship has included a corporation, 
interest group and labor union. This recent development is the result of the slow curtailment of 
campaign finance laws allowing a wealthy corporation, interest group or labor union to influence 
the electoral process by donating unlimited sums of money to elect their preferred candidate into 
office.  
 The slow curtailment of campaign finance laws starting with Buckley V. Valeo’s roll 
back of spending limits and ending with Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission tilted 
the scale to favor the wealthy individual and corporation, over the non – affluent voter. 
Furthermore, large contributions by wealthy individuals and corporations to elected officials 
distort the decision making by the elected official to favor the policy interest of the large donor, 
rather than the constituents the elected officials serve. Consequently, the concerns of non – 
affluent voters are minimized and weakened in favor of corporate interests and these corporate 
interests do not represent the majority of the electorate in the United States.  
To add to the complexity, the Supreme Court struck down campaign finance provisions 
such as, spending limits, contribution limits, and fundraising limits on the basis these limits 
violate the First Amendment (Freedom of Speech). The Supreme Court ruled these spending, 
fundraising and contribution limits restricted the free political speech of the donor and reduces 
the amount of political information accessible to voters. The Supreme Court argued the First 
Amendment is essential in a democracy, thus is equally important during an election cycle. To 
allow more speech, the Supreme Court struck down these limits to allow the electorate to have 
more information whether it’s good or bad, negative or positive. Ironically, these restrictions 
were meant to preserve and protect the individual’s right to vote, regardless of how much money 




they can or cannot donate. Hence, ensuring voters have an equal say in the political process. 
These campaign finance laws restricted the amount of money passed from a political action 
committee and a super political action committee for advertisements funded by independent 
expenditures that advocated for or against a candidate, thus ensuring voters are able to hear 
political information from multiple sides to make an informed decision at the ballot box.  
These three thesis chapters first provide the reader with an overview of different 
campaign finance laws enacted by Congress then rolled back by the Supreme Court on the basis 
they violated the First Amendment. Next, these three chapters provide the reader with an in-
depth analysis of the different strategies interest groups use to allocate campaign contributions 
and why this strategy shifted after the Citizens United decision. The reader will gain a 
comprehensive understanding of how much money as a result of curtailed campaign finance laws 
poured into interest groups issue advertisements and its effects on the electorate. Finally, the 
reader will gain a comprehensive understanding of what dark money is, how its funneled to a 
candidate running for office, how interest groups (PACs and Super PACs) play a pivotal role, 
and the impact dark money has on advertisements used to persuade voters during an election 
cycle. By the same token, it is the hope these three chapters shine a light on the effect money has 
in the electoral system. Money gives the candidate a chance to communicate their message to the 
electorate, but too much of it has damaging effects on voters who cannot donate in unlimited 
sums but still need their interests represented. These thesis chapters demonstrate how the non – 
affluent voter is excluded from the political process, to favor the wealthy special interests 
donating in record sums to the candidate running for office.  
 The first chapter explores how the proliferation of interest groups in the form of political 
action committees impact the allocation of campaign contributions to elect a candidate during an 




election cycle. This chapter examines two different strategies interest groups use to elect their 
preferred candidate into office: an electoral donation strategy and an access – oriented donation 
strategy. Previous literature suggests, interest groups use two strategies to decide how to donate 
money. They can donate simply to gain access to the legislative process, access-oriented 
donation strategy, or they can donate to win seats by pushing a candidate of their choice,  
electoral oriented donation strategy. Interest groups who are well established, have money either 
by donations or membership dues, occupy ideologically extreme ends of the political spectrum 
and occupy highly politicalized industries  (gun rights, abortion, gay rights) want to win seats 
during an election. These interest groups maximize their donations by giving to candidates that 
align with them ideologically. These interest groups have access to the legislature through their 
relationships with lawmakers, so their goal is to win seats by donating large sums of money to 
produce issue advertisements on behalf of their preferred candidates. Hence, an electoral 
donation strategy becomes more valuable for interest groups who have money, influence, and 
identify as partisan.  
Through examining the electoral donation strategy of the National Rifle Association 
during the 2012 presidential election and 2016 presidential election this chapter concludes 
interest groups who use an electoral donation strategy increase their chances of electing their 
preferred candidate into office. In order to influence the outcome of an election, interest groups 
must back a candidate that aligns ideologically with their policy objectives and use their general 
treasury fund to run advertisements to elect their preferred candidate.   
The second thesis dives deeper into campaign finance, specifically how and why 
campaign spending affects media advertisements and polarization during an election cycle.  The 
second chapter explores the question, “How does the proliferation of interest groups in the form 




of political action committees impact campaign spending on media advertisements during an 
election cycle?” Likewise, the second chapter explores the evolution of campaign finance laws 
starting from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA), to the Supreme Court case 
challenging FECA, Buckley V. Valeo (510 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), to the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107 – 155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 
2356), to the Supreme Court case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 
310, 130 S Ct. 876 (2010), which struck down important campaign finance provisions restricting 
the flow of money into the electoral system.  
On that note, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 in an attempt 
to restrict the amount of campaign money from corporate interests after Richard Nixon’s 
campaign in 1968. Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, which 
established expenditure limits for candidates, contribution limits for individuals and unions. 
FECA established the Federal Election Commission, created a public funding system for 
presidential candidates, set limits on expenditures ($1,000 contribution limit to candidate 
committee per election) and allowed corporations and unions to establish political action 
committees (PACs) to solicit donations. FECA set a $5,000 limit on individual’s contributions to 
a PAC, limited PACs to a $5,000 contribution to a corporate election committee, and improved 
disclosure requirements for candidates and PACs.7 FECA remained law until 1976.  
 These provisions did not sit well with candidates who claimed these restrictions violated 
their First Amendment right to voice their political opinions (political speech). The first Supreme 
Court case to challenge FECA was Buckley V. Valeo (510 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  The 
                                                      
7 Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform: Chapter 4: 
Explaining Campaign Finance Reform and the BCRA (Ann Arbor Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 
2008), pg. 78 – 79.  




Supreme Court in Buckley V Valeo, upheld parts of FECA, but declared other parts 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed with the $1,000 limit on individual contributions to 
a candidate, and the $5,000 limit a PAC can contribute to a single candidate. The Court ruled 
contribution limits, “served a vital public interest in protecting against corruption.”8 The Court 
further ruled independent expenditure limits (expenditures on communication that expressly 
advocates for one candidate over another by saying the magic words of ‘elect and defeat,’) were 
unconstitutional, limitations on candidates using their personal funds to finance their campaign 
were ruled unconstitutional, and limits on total campaign expenditures were ruled 
unconstitutional. The Court ruled these provisions unconstitutional because they violated a 
candidate’s freedom of speech (First Amendment).9 This decision allowed more money to enter 
the electoral system through political action committees (PACs). Political action committees can 
solicit donations from individuals and then give those funds to the candidate provided the 
exchange is not coordinated with the candidates. Moreover, PACs donate to candidates in the 
form of soft money. Soft money skirts Federal Election Commission regulations because it’s 
donated for, “party building activities,” such as, get out the vote drives, issue advertisements, and 
voter registration drives. This decision reshaped campaign finance laws to favor wealthy self – 
funded candidates, and permitted political action committees to enter the electoral system.  
 In an attempt to regulate the spending limits and contribution limits, Congress passed the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107 – 155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 
2002, H.R. 2356) (BCRA). The BCRA banned the use of soft money, but increased the 
contribution limit for individuals and relaxed restrictions on aggregate spending. The BCRA 
                                                      
8 Ibid, pg. 77. 
9 FEC, Summary of Buckley V Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, D.D.C. 1975, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-
cases/buckley-v-valeo/  




allowed wealthy individuals to donate multiple times to the same candidate during an election 
cycle. In turn, candidates solicited the same wealthy donors; thus, allowing candidates to cater to 
special interests. The BCRA only diverted the money elsewhere (to wealth donors) as opposed to 
restricting the flow of it into the electoral system.  
These restrictions were further relaxed in 2010 when the Supreme Court heard the case 
Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310, 130 S Ct. 876 (2010). Citizens 
United V. Federal Election Commission ruled corporations, unions and interest groups could use 
their general treasury and donate in unlimited sums to directly affect the outcome of an election. 
Corporations, unions and interest groups can directly affect the outcome of an election by 
running issue advertisements on tv. The Court argued, donations are a form of expressing a 
political opinion (free speech), and restricting donations impede the ability for a corporation to 
voice their political opinion. Furthermore, when interest groups run ads on tv they are giving the 
electorate a diverse set of opinions and viewpoints to draw from prior to casting their ballot. 
Furthermore, corporations, unions, and interest groups deserve the same First Amendment 
protections as individuals receive under the Constitution. Hence, money is a form of free speech 
should be protected as such.  
Second, Citizens United ruled, corporations, unions, and interest groups did not have to 
abide by election law governing the timing of their advertisements and these ads from interest 
groups and corporations can explicitly advocate for a candidate.  Prior to Citizens United, interest 
groups could not run ads on tv thirty days prior to a primary election, and sixty days prior to a 
general election because it was considered electioneering. Moreover, interest groups could not 
run ads that contained, ‘elect or defeat.’  Citizens United ruled interest groups can run ads that 
contained the words, ‘elect and defeat,’ up and till Election Day influencing voters because 




money is a form of free speech. Likewise, these ads appearing on tv after Citizens United could 
were funded by the interest group’s general treasury fund. Moreover, these limits on the timing 
of ads restrict the free speech of corporations, unions and interest groups. Furthermore, voters 
need to make an informed decision based on information (negative and positive) prior to casting 
their ballot. This drastically changed the way candidates, donors, and voters interacted with one 
another.  
Furthermore, chapter two of this thesis examines, as a result of Citizens United, interest 
groups spent unlimited sums of money to elect their preferred candidate into office by blitzing 
the airwaves with issue ads. These issue ads repeated multiple times prior to and on Election 
Day. Chapter two examines two election cycles; 2008 presidential election occurring prior to 
Citizens United and the 2016 presidential election occurring after Citizens United. By comparing 
and contrasting these two election cycles, chapter two concludes polarization occurred within the 
electorate in 2008, not with the issue ads produced by Obama or an interest group affiliated with 
Obama. This was due to federal election laws prohibiting issue ads from appearing on tv thirty 
days prior to a primary and sixty days prior to a general election. In 2016, polarization also 
occurred within the electorate, but for a different reason. Polarization was due to the amount of 
money interest groups poured into producing issue advertisements that repeated on tv multiple 
times prior to and on Election Day. These issue advertisements skewed negative and provided 
voters limited information about both candidates. From these ads, voters are asked to make a 
decision based on limited information from the advertisement. This limited information has the 
potential to reinforce the voter’s already held beliefs about the candidates, pushing voters to 
polar opposites of the political spectrum.  




Issue advertisements provide voters with limited information not only about the issues 
discussed, but who funded the ad and who sponsored the ad. The third chapter of the thesis 
explores the question, “How does the proliferation of dark money groups impact transparency of 
political information during an election cycle?” Independent expenditure advertisements are 
sponsored by political action committees or super political action committees who air ads to 
explicitly advocate and elect their preferred candidate. However, if donors do not want their 
name and how much they donated disclosed to the Federal Election Commission, the donor can 
give secretly to the candidate through a social welfare organization called a “501 c (4).”  This 
thesis furthers the hypothesis that curtailed campaign finance laws permitted dark money groups 
to reduce transparency of political information, causing negative and deceptive political 
advertisements to increase during an election cycle.  
Likewise, these social welfare organizations, “501 c (4)’s,” are allowed to make political 
contributions, so long as their political contributions do not exceed 49% of the organizations 
expenditures. These social welfare organizations do not have disclose who they are donating to 
or how much they give to a political candidate. This type of giving where the social welfare 
organization does not have to disclose who they are donating to or how much is exchanging 
hands is called dark money. The social welfare organizations who conceal their donors and who 
they are funding are called dark money groups. Money is funneled by the dark money group to 
either a PAC and Super PAC who will then produce ads on behalf of the dark money group’s 
candidate. As a result, when the voter watches the ad on tv they will not know who funded the ad 
or who sponsored it.  
This thesis chapter examines two election cycles; the 2012 Presidential Election and the 
2018 Midterm Election in Arizona. During the 2012 Presidential Election conservative dark 




money groups outspent liberal dark money groups to demonstrate how the Affordable Health 
Care Act (ACA) would increase taxes as a result of the individual mandate.10 The dark money 
group operating during the 2012 Presidential Election was called, “Americans for Prosperity.”  
Americans for Prosperity ran issue ads misinforming voters, leading them to think the ACA 
would do more harm than good. Although Obama won the 2012 Presidential Election, dark 
money groups had just begun ramping up their operations for the 2018 Midterm Elections.   
The 2018 Midterm Elections saw the highest amount of dark money spending after 
Citizens United, with liberal dark money groups outspending conservative dark money groups. 
The second case study examines the Democratic dark money group, Majority Forward operating 
during the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona. Majority Forward poured money into the Midterm 
Election in Arizona to unseat Republican Senator Martha McSally, with the goal of electing 
Democratic Senator Kyrsten Sinema. Majority Forward blitzed the airwaves with health care ads 
slamming Martha McSally’s push to end the ACA, and hike insurance rates for adults over the 
age of 50. Majority Forward successfully elected Kyrsten Sinema by pouring money into issue 
ads supporting her. The issue ads Majority Forward produced allowed them to conceal their 
donors, thus removing the link between the donor and the candidate. Inadvertently, this also 
decreases accountability in the electoral process, by favoring the wealthy (secret) donors as 
opposed to the electorate the candidate represents and serves. Ironically, the vary provisions the 
Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in Buckley V. Valeo, Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002, and 
Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission gave affluent voters more influence in the 
political process by steadily increasing the amount of money entering the electoral sphere. By 
steadily increasing the amount of money in the electoral system, the Supreme Court tilted the 
                                                      
10 Joanne Kenen, “Congress and the Affordable Care Act,” Health Policy Brief, Health Affairs, February 25, 2011, 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20110225.325684/full/  




scale to favor the wealthy, instead of the electorate the candidate (and eventually the elected 
official) represents. The Supreme Court tilted the scale to favor the free speech rights of 
corporations over individuals in Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. By favoring 
corporations, the Supreme Court changed the way interest groups, candidates, donors and the 
electorate interact with one another. The first chapter of this thesis explores the dynamic between 
interest groups, candidates, and the electorate post – Citizens United and the strategies interest 
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Campaign finance laws were passed with the original intent to prevent large sums of 
money from entering the political process; therefore, potentially swaying candidates to vote in 
favor of those who donated the most. However, each time campaign finance laws passed in 
Congress; the Supreme Court found reasons to strike them down. The most notable being the 
2010 Supreme Court case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310, 130 S 
Ct. 876 (2010). In Citizens United, the Court ruled money is a form of political speech and 
corporations/ labor unions can use money from their treasury fund to elect a candidate of their 
choice. This essay explores the question, “How does the proliferation of interest groups (in the 
form of Political Action Committees) impact the allocation of campaign contributions to elect a 
candidate during an election cycle?”  This essay will examine a number of theoretical 
frameworks that explain how interest groups allocate campaign contributions either to elect a 
candidate (electoral oriented) or to push policy in Congress (access oriented). These theoretical 
frameworks suggest, interest groups who use an electoral donation strategy, as opposed to an 
access-oriented donation strategy, increase their chances of electing their preferred candidate into 
office. To further prove this hypothesis, this paper uses a comparative case study of the National 
Rifle Association’s contributions in the 2012 presidential election and 2016 Presidential Election 
compared with the NRA’s spending on issue advertisement in both election cycles. This will 
advance the claim interest groups who use an electoral donation strategy, as opposed to an 
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In 2010, the Supreme Court heard the case Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission (558 U.S. 310, 130 S Ct. 876 (2010), which determined corporations have a right to 
free speech in the American electoral process and can contribute money from their general 
treasury to fund a candidate. This has drastically changed the way candidates, interest groups and 
the American public gain information about policy issues and the candidates prior to an election. 
This suggests, “How does the proliferation of interest groups (in the form of Political Action 
Committees) impact the allocation of campaign contributions to elect a candidate during an 
election cycle?”   
To answer this question, there will be a brief explanation of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Citizens United and its implications on campaign finance laws.  Second, this essay will 
examine a number of theoretical frameworks that explain how interest groups allocate campaign 
contributions in an election cycle. The Supreme Court Decision Citizens United changed how 
interest groups decide how much and to whom they donate during an election cycle. Citizens 
United allowed interest groups to use money from their treasury to fund television ads explicitly 
to defeat a candidate. Likewise, interest groups not only donated for the sake of obtaining access 
to the policy making process, but donated to win electoral seats. For interest groups who are 
highly partisan and occupy space in a policy field that is highly partisan, donating to win seats 
becomes increasingly more valuable. This will further the argument that interest groups that use 
an electoral donation strategy, as opposed to an access-oriented donation strategy, increase their 
chances of electing their preferred candidate into office. This essay uses a comparative case 
study of the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) political spending in the 2012 Presidential 
Election and in the 2016 Presidential Election.  Likewise, this case study will use the NRA’s 




independent expenditure reports to demonstrate Mitt Romney lost the 2012 election because he 
was not ideologically aligned with the NRA’s policy objectives. Thus, this made it harder for the 
NRA to deploy an electoral strategy and back their candidate of choice. Whereas, the 2016 
Presidential election, Donald Trump was ideologically aligned with the NRA, so the NRA could 
use an electoral donation strategy to elect their preferred candidate.  
The backdrop of interest group proliferation: Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission: 
The Supreme Court case that drastically changed the landscape of campaign finance 
reform was Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission (FEC). Citizens United, a nonprofit 
conservative organization, produced and released a film called, Hillary: The Movie. The Movie 
was released before the 2008 primary election. Hillary: The Movie was a negative portrayal 
critiquing former Senator Hillary Clinton.11 Citizens United released the film to theaters, but 
then decided to increase the distribution of the film. Citizens United paid Comcast $1 million to 
broadcast the film via on demand TV services.12  
Furthermore, Citizens United made the film free via on demand services, by paying 
Comcast directly, “from its political action committee funded from donations from 
individuals.”13 The film’s release date to free on demand services was scheduled for thirty days 
prior to the primary election. As a result, the FEC banned the release of the film.   
The FEC banned the release of the film because Citizens United ran afoul of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s electioneering clause, which “prohibits corporations 
                                                      
11 Cory Brettschneider, Constitutional Law and American Democracy: Chapter 5 Free Speech, New York, Wolster 
Kluwer Law and Business, (2012), pg. 650 – 651.  
12 Richard L. Hanson, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American 
Elections Chapter 5: Censorship, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2016), Chapter 5, pg. 107.  
13 Ibid, pg. 107.  




from using their general treasury funds for “electioneering communications.”14 Electioneering 
communication is, “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly 
identified federal candidate made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary 
election,”15   
Because issue ads are funded by soft money, they bypass FEC regulations. Soft money 
from a political party is money raised by political parties for, “party building,” activities such as, 
get out the vote drives, voter registration, and issue advertisements.16 Soft money is not directly 
donated to a candidate. Instead, soft money is donated to a party.  Hard money is money given 
directly to a candidate running for office by individuals. Under the BCRA, hard money (direct 
monetary contributions) limits were increased from $1,000 per individual/ per candidate/ per 
election cycle to $2,000 per individual/ per candidate/ per election cycle.17  
Citizens United sued the FEC over the blockage of the film. Citizens United stated it is 
their First Amendment right to decide which candidate they will oppose. The Supreme Court 
held that, restricting the amount of money a corporation/ union can donate, “effectively restricts 
the number of issues discussed, the quantity of expression, and the size of the audience 
reached.”18 The Court shared that speech is, “essential,” in a democracy, by holding elected 
                                                      
14 L., Paige Whitaker, Erika K. Lunder, Jack Maskell, and Michael Seitzinger, ““Legislative Options After Citizens 
United V. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues,” Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, March 2010, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf, Summary Page, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf  
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officials accountable and should not be prohibited.19 By the same token, the First Amendment 
(freedom of speech) is by far the most important during an election cycle.20   
The Court argued limiting a corporations/ union right to use money from their treasury to 
directly defeat a candidate violates freedom of political speech. This means that corporations/ 
labor unions have the same freedom of speech rights as individuals do under the United States 
Constitution.  
The Theoretical Concepts Behind How Interest Groups Donate to Campaigns:  
This decision allowed the proliferation of interest groups to form to defeat a candidate, 
and also changed the way interest groups allocate campaign contributions during an election 
cycle. Likewise, there are different theoretical frameworks explaining how interest groups 
allocate campaign contributions.  
According to Baron, there are two types of voters in the electoral process: the informed 
voter and the uninformed voter. Informed voters are assumed to be educated on the policy 
positions of the candidate. However, the uninformed voter does not know the policy position of 
the candidate so his or her vote is influenced by campaign expenditures.21 The equilibrium is 
where all voters vote as if they were informed and candidates choose positions at the median of 
the voters. Candidates bases their policy positions on the median of the voters. This theory is 
called the Median Voter Theorem.22  
However, many voters are uninformed about policy positions of the candidate so 
campaign expenditures are a tool to inform uninformed voters.23  The presence of uninformed 
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voters cause candidates to cater to interest groups, thus attracting donations. This theory assumes 
if there are few uninformed voters to influence through campaign expenditures, then candidates 
will compete for the share of uniformed voters by moving towards the median of voters.24 
However, there are more uninformed voters than informed voters so campaign contributions 
become a necessary tool to inform voters about the policy positions of the candidates.25  
According to Apollonio and La Raja there are two main reasons interest groups donate to 
candidates running for office.26 The first reason is to build working relationships with lawmakers 
as a means to pass the interest groups preferred legislation (access oriented). The second reason 
is simply to win electoral votes, by supporting a candidate who holds the same ideological 
viewpoint as the interest group (electoral oriented).27  
After Citizens United, soft money changed the way interest groups and candidates 
interact with one another. Apollonio and La Raja concluded that, interest groups who have a 
membership base and who are experienced in their field decrease soft money donations and rely 
on other methods of electoral support.28 On the other hand, non-membership interest groups with 
limited resources have an incentive to donate soft money directly from their treasury.29  
After Citizens United, candidates realized they could rely on the same wealthy donors’ 
multiple times. According to Sebold and Dowdle, candidates will maximize their electoral 
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prospects and fundraising success by creating a “donor pond.”30 A donor pond allows candidates 
to solicit the same wealthy donors’ multiple times during an election cycle.31 Republican donors 
during the 2016 election relied on small contributions multiple times to push Donald Trump.32 
Hillary Clinton relied on large contributions throughout her campaign, but these contributions 
were only given once during the election cycle.33  
Even if they claim to be nonpartisan, interest groups tend to donate more money to one 
party over another. According to Brunell, interest groups allocate their money based on how 
“electoral useful,” the donations will be to the candidate.34  Strategic donations help the interest 
group gain access, but do not  represent their ideological preference.35 On the other hand, a 
sincere donation is given to maximize the electoral benefit to the interest group’s preferred 
candidate.36 Partisanship is higher amongst interest groups whose goal is to maximize the 
electoral usefulness of their donation, thus an electoral donation strategy becomes more 
valuable.37 Similarly, McKay found the more ideological extreme an interest group is, the more 
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likely they will favor an electoral oriented donation strategy to win seats.38 Republican interest 
groups tend to donate to one party to maximize their electoral win.39  
Furthermore, when interest groups rely on their members to remain civically engaged, 
they are more likely to generate organized representation in government. According to Grossman 
and La Raja, politically extreme groups tend to hold views outside mainstream political opinions, 
so they are better positioned to influence lawmakers.40  Republican groups are more centralized 
and more ideologically consistent.41 Likewise, strong partisans tend to move to the ideological 
extremes of their parties, which encourages them to make campaign donations to their preferred 
candidate.42  
Interest group donation behavior varies based on how much political attention is given to 
a particular industry. According to Barber and Eatough, interest groups in highly politicalized 
industries will exhibit electoral donation behaviors.43  The interest groups in these industries tend 
to garner the most media attention and the most controversy from voters.44  These industries 
include interest group lobbying for gun rights, abortion, gay rights, etc.45 Interest groups in 
highly politicalized industries will want to maximize their donation and give to candidates who 
align ideologically with their issue.46  Campaign contributions in highly politicalized industries 
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stress putting someone in office over access because these interest groups have access to the 
legislature. In other words, highly politicalized interest groups want to win seats.47  
Interest groups can either diverge from the issue debate of a candidate or match the issue 
debate. According to Franz, Fowler, and Ridout, interest groups can act as if they were the 
candidate by matching the candidate’s ideological viewpoint. This type of behavior is called 
acting like a ‘loyal foot solider.’ Alternatively, interest groups can inject their favored issue into 
the policy debate. This behavior is called ‘acting like a loose cannon.’48 Multi issue non 
membership groups tend to focus on issues similar to their preferred candidate.49 However, 
single issue interest groups tend to inject their own issues into the debate.50 In the 2016 election, 
Republican single-issue groups remained loyal foot soldiers to Donald Trump.51  
One of the interest groups who was able to remain a loyal foot soldier to Donald Trump 
was the National Rifle Association. The NRA was able to not only match the issue debate of 
Donald Trump, but developed a social identity around gun control and gun ownership.  
The National Rifle Association developed a distinct strategy to capture the political attention of 
gun owners. According to Lacombe, the NRA created a positive social identity around gun 
ownership, and created a negative social identify around gun control. 52 The NRA portrayed gun 
owners using words such as, law abiding, peaceful, and freedom loving. These descriptions 
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altered the public’s perception on gun ownership.53 Gun control is then seen as a threat to the 2nd 
Amendment right guaranteed in the Constitution.54  
By creating a positive social identity around gun ownership, the National Rifle 
Association backed candidates who aligned ideologically with the NRA’s policy objectives. 
According to Musa, the NRA mobilized their five million members to engage in non-political 
activities such as, phone banking, letter writing campaigns, and political donations.55 The NRA 
created the NRA Institute for Legislative Affairs (NRA – ILA). NRA – ILA allowed them to hire 
former legislators to lobby elected officials who would carry out the NRA’s policy goals.56  
The NRA dangles money and electoral support over the heads of Republican lawmakers 
in an attempt to sway public opinion. According to Spies, the NRA flooded Florida with pro-gun 
legislation because they knew Governor Rick Scott would pass it.57 In 2014, Governor Scott 
passed a law that allowed people without a permit to carry a concealed handgun during an 
evacuation.58 If the bill did not pass, the NRA threatened to pull support for Republican 
lawmakers, including Governor Scott. Governor Scott was up for reelection. Needless to say, he 
won reelection and signed the bill. 59  Before and after 2014, the NRA worked behind the scenes 
to elect their preferred candidate into office.  
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This is exemplified in the 2012 Presidential Election and 2016 Presidential Election 
where the NRA’s money and influence played a significant role in the electoral system. Through 
a comparative case study of the National Rifle Association’s donation behavior during the 2012 
Presidential Election and the 2016 Presidential Election, this case study concludes the National 
Rifle Association was able to elect their preferred candidate in 2016 but not in 2012 due to two 
things. First, in 2012, Mitt Romney was not ideologically aligned with the NRA, so the NRA 
prioritized access to the legislative process over winning electoral seats. Second, in 2016, Donald 
Trump stated he was ideologically aligned with the NRA. This made it easy for the NRA to push 
Trump by running negative ads attacking Hillary Clinton. Prior work focused on interest groups 
gaining access to the legislature before a major election or vote in Congress, but after Citizens 
United money became a voice in the electoral process and interest groups capitalized on it 
quickly. Moreover, prior work does not explain how interest groups allocate campaign 
contributions to increase their chances of electing their preferred candidate into office. This essay 
will advance the hypothesis that interest groups who use an electoral donation strategy, as 
opposed to an access-oriented donation strategy, increase their chances of electing their preferred 
candidate into office.  
  This essay utilizes NRA contribution reports given to the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC). The FEC labels contributions as “total contributions.” The FEC shows the total amount 
of contributions in one column, then breaks the total amount of contributions into categories. 
One of these categories is, “outside spending,” which further breaks down into independent 
expenditures. The FEC labels spending on issue advertisement as an independent expenditure. 
This case study will compare the NRA’s independent expenditures in the 2012 Presidential 




Election and 2016 Presidential Election, against television ad campaigns the NRA waged in both 
elections. This essay uses data on the percentage of ads that contain, “pro - gun references,” in 
the 2012 election and 2016 election cycles. This essay also uses data on tv ad spending by 
candidate and interest group in the 2012 and 2016 election cycle. This essay uses three articles 
written after the 2016 Presidential Election demonstrating three things. One, how negative ads 
from interest groups garner less backlash from voters than ads produced by the candidate running 
for office. Two, how Donald Trump escaped the backlash effect by allowing the NRA to run the 
ads, instead of himself. Finally, how pro Trump political action committees attacked Hillary 
Clinton based on her character traits rather than her policy. This strategy appealed to more voters 
than the ads used by pro Hillary Clinton political action committees.  
Comparative Case Study: The National Rifle Association: 
The National Rifle Association is a nonprofit organization with the purpose of, 
“promoting and encouraging rifle shooting on a scientific basis,” for hunting and sporting 
purposes. However, the National Rifle Association shifted to lobbying for gun rights in the 
legislative and the electoral process.   
Prior to Citizens United, the NRA could not use money from its general treasury fund to 
explicitly defeat a candidate for federal office. To compensate, the NRA created, “NRA 
News.”60 The NRA News (a news source for gun owners/ gun enthusiast) called itself, “an 
ideological nonprofit corporation,” which became a conduit for political spending. NRA News 
allowed them to solicit donations from their members and give those donations to a candidate’s 
political party.61 The NRA News dissolved in 1975 and formed the Institute for Legislative 
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Action NRA – ILA. NRA ILA is the lobbying arm of the National Rifle Association. Through 
the NRA – ILA, the NRA had the power to solicit donations from members and donate it directly 
to a candidate without reporting it to the FEC.62  
The beginning of 2012 was marked by the resignation of U.S Representative Gabriel 
Gifford. Gabriel Gifford was shot in an Arizona mass shooting. The shooting left her paralyzed 
and wounded eighteen other people.63 After the shooting, the Obama administration took steps to 
restrict the mentally ill from obtaining assault rifles.  In response, the NRA mobilized its 
members to donate to candidates running in the next election who would protect 2nd amendment 
rights. One of these candidates the NRA supported was Mitt Romney.  
 Come November 2012, Barack Obama ran against Mitt Romney. The NRA endorsed 
Mitt Romney. According to 2012 Federal Election Commission data (compiled by Open 
Secrets: Center for Responsive Politics), the National Rifle Association contributed 
$1,195,442. Their independent expenditures totaled $18,607,356.64  2012 would be the most 
expensive general election.  
Independent expenditures, money used for advertisements allowing the interest group to 
explicitly say, “elect or defeat,” made it possible for the NRA to explicitly supporting Mitt 
Romney. According to Barry, et al, 86% of the Republican candidate ads had pro-gun 
references.65 Moreover, 45% of these ads made, “pro NRA mentions,” with the 2012 election 
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cycle containing more pro NRA ads than the 2016 election cycle.66 However, only 23% of the 
ads in 2012 mentioned 2nd Amendment rights.67 In 2012, Republican outside interest groups 
aired 51% of all pro Romney ads.68 This breaks down to 673 ads aired in 19 different media 
markets.69 The NRA drowned the media market in Pennsylvania with $4.95 million in ads.70 
However, Obama won Luzerne County, Pennsylvania by 53% of the vote. Romney lost that 
same county by 46.8% of the vote.71 By the same token, the NRA spent a total of $5,677,949 
on broadcast ads during the 2012 election.72 The NRA worked hard to push their candidate of 
choice through ads, but Obama won.  
Obama’s re – election victory was due to three factors, with the third factor being the one 
attributed to Romney’s loss. One, Obama’s campaign outspent Romney by dumping their 
money into social media advertising and broadcast tv advertising.  Two, Obama’s campaign 
painted Romney as a candidate who was “removed,” from the struggles Americans faced; 
mainly the economy.73 Third, Mitt Romney did not align ideologically with the NRA 
throughout his career as Governor of Massachusetts. As Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt 
Romney’s stance on gun control was not consistent. Romney quadrupled gun licensing fees, 
making it harder for people to register fire arms. In 1994 he claimed, “I don’t line up 100% 
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with the NRA.” Romney demonstrated he was not ideologically aligned.74 Politico reported as 
Governor, Romney supported two of the toughest gun control measures.75 He supported the 
Brady Bill and a ban on assault style rifles. The Brady Bill mandated background checks on 
fire arms purchased in the U.S.76 In 2004 he signed a permanent ban on assault weapons, 
stating, “these guns are not made for recreation or self-defense.77  
As soon as Romney made his bid for president in 2008, he supported the NRA. Romney 
supported the right of Americans to own guns. Romney viewed the 2nd Amendment right as 
intrinsic to American life, and did not support adding new legislation to the assault weapons 
ban.78 On one hand, he supported the Brady Bill, but on the other, became a lifetime member of 
the NRA. This 360-degree shift did not sit well with NRA members. A longtime member of the 
NRA David Ross stated… “He was for an assault weapons ban, what changed? And how do we 
know he won’t change back?”79  
Romney’s stance made the NRA nervous that they could not elect their preferred 
candidate into office. With the shooting of Gabriel Gifford and Obama’s push for stricter gun 
control measures, the NRA stressed access to the legislative process over electoral support for 
Mitt Romney. During the first half of 2012, the NRA spent $695,000 and their efforts were 
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directed at the House and Senate.80 In total, the NRA spent $2.9 million on lobbying efforts in 
2012, more money than in previous years.81 At the same time, the NRA pushed Congress to pass 
pro - gun legislation at the federal level.  
By December of 2012, the NRA lobbied for pro – gun legislation in Congress. In 
December of 2012 the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting killed twenty children and 
six adults. In response to the deadly mass shooting, the NRA lobbied for bills that would loosen 
gun restrictions. According to Childress, twenty-seven states passed ninety-three laws expanding 
gun rights. Out of a thousand pieces of legislation presented to Congress in 2013, 43 gun control 
bills passed.82 After the shooting, the NRA spent $655,000 in lobbying efforts.83 Furthermore, 
the Obama Administration proposed the Manchin Toomey Amendment, requiring background 
checks at gun shows and for online purchases. The NRA poured $830,000 to influence Members 
of Congress to vote against the bill. The amendment failed 54 to 46.84 Four years later, the NRA 
found a presidential candidate they felt supported their policy goals in the legislative process.  
In 2016, the NRA backed Donald Trump. Donald Trump said in a 2016 Second 
Amendment Speech transcribed by Time Magazine, “Your Second Amendment, the National 
Rifle Association endorsed and they endorsed me early,”85 In 2016, the NRA contributed a total 
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of $1,094,909 with independent expenditures totaling $52,582,309.86 Although the NRA’s total 
contributions were lower in 2016, their independent expenditures increased during that same 
year.87  
To solidify their chances electing a candidate who would win the presidency, the NRA 
launched a series of TV ads to influence voters.  At this point for the NRA, relying on an access-
oriented donation strategy was not as valuable given the amount of money the NRA poured into 
ads campaigns. The NRA spent a total of $10,565,655 on broadcast ads.88 The NRA spent more 
in 2016 on broadcast ads than they did in 2012. According to Barry, et al in 2016, 25% of the 
Republican candidate ads had gun related mentions referring to the NRA.89 Moreover, only 23% 
of the ads mentioned 2nd Amendment rights.90 In the ads sampled, 2016 had two ads focused on 
guns. The rest of the ads did not make direct reference to the NRA.91  The ads featured the NRA 
logo at the end of the ad or implied support for Trump by showing traditional American values.92 
By the NRA showing ads implying support for Trump, but not saying his name he 
managed to escape the, “backlash effect.” According to Dowling and Wichowsky, partisan and 
ideological ads sponsored by interest groups or political parties remove the link between the 
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negative ad and the candidate.93 Interest groups provide a benefit to the candidate because voters 
do not make the direct association between the ad and the candidates position towards an issue.94 
Therefore, voters do not come to negative conclusions about the candidate.95 Political action 
committees are not accountable to anyone, so they can say what they want and it will not 
backfire on the campaign or the candidate.  
This dynamic was advantageous for the NRA because they could run as many attack ads 
as they wanted to elect their candidate of choice into office. In 2016, their candidate of choice 
was Donald Trump. One of the ads the NRA ran featured a frantic woman calling 911 because 
her home was burglarized. She reached for the gun she kept in a safe, but it was not there. The ad 
goes on to say, “…But Hillary Clinton could take her right to self-defense…do not let Hillary 
leave you protected with nothing but a phone.”96 This ad played into the fear Hillary Clinton 
would leave people defenseless in the face of danger. This threat mobilized NRA members to 
donate money to Donald Trump.  
Moreover, this ad attacks Clinton’s stance on guns without mentioning Donald Trump. 
The NRA logo is displayed at the end, so the voter does not link the ad to Trump. As Geer 
explained, the candidate that is trying to find issue with his opponent will highlight areas of 
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disagreement and show how ill-advised their opponents policy plan seems.97 The ad implies 
Hillary Clinton will take away the right to self-defense, which puts everyone in danger especially 
women.98  
The 2016 election cycle saw tv ads that were drastically different in tone than the 2012 
election. In the 2012 election cycle around 70% of the ads were negative.99  According to 
Fowler, Ridout and Franz, around 55% of the tv ads in 2016 election cycle were negative.100 The 
decline is attributed to the tone of Donald Trump’s ads. According to Fowler, Ridout and Franz, 
Donald Trump’s ads were contrast ads. Donald Trump’s contrast ads portrayed Hillary Clinton 
negatively, but transmitted valuable information about Trump.101 In total, Hillary Clinton’s ads 
focused on Trump’s character flaws 60% of the time, and focused on her policy 25% of the 
time.102 Trump’s ads focused on his policies and a discussion about his policies 70% of the 
time.103 Trump’s ad strategy allowed him to run a campaign where his issue debate matched the 
debate of the NRA. Likewise, it became easy for the NRA to push Trump electorally given this 
mutual relationship. According to Geer, candidates [including Trump] will pour over the past 
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actions of the opposition for weaknesses.104 The NRA used Hillary Clinton’s past actions to 
weaken her chance of garnering votes and winning.  
The NRA ran an ad attacking Hillary for her past actions as Secretary of State during the 
Benghazi attack. The ad featured a soldier who survived the Benghazi attack stating, “…I served 
in Benghazi.  My friends did not make it. Hillary as president? No thanks. I did my part, you do 
yours.”105 The ad has nothing to do with guns, but pointed to her past actions as Secretary of 
State. This ad demonstrated to the American public Hillary Clinton, “obstructed,” efforts to save 
soldiers on the battlefield.106 This ad ran in swing states such as, Ohio, Nevada, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Maine and Colorado.107 The ad was sponsored by the NRA instead of Trump. Thus, the 
backlash effect was minimal.  
The tv ads the NRA aired were not only contrast ads, but they were ad hominem attack 
ads. According to Tedesco and Dunn, ad hominem attack ads focus on the personal 
characteristics of the candidate or leadership traits.108 The Benghazi ad was an attack of Hillary 
Clinton's leadership traits. Ad hominem attack ads garner attention to personal characters rather 
than policy arguments.109  In the ads produced by pro Trump political action committees the 
focus of the ad was split between character appeal and campaign issues.110 Likewise, 37% of pro 
Trump political action committee ads attacked Hillary based on her policy. Whereas, 53% of the 
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pro Trump political action committee ads attacked Hillary based on her character.111 However, 
pro Hillary Clinton political action committee ads focused on Trump’s character 87% of the 
time.112 Hillary's campaign and pro Hillary political action committees missed the opportunity to 
highlight her policy objectives. Instead, pro Hillary political action committees focused on 
attacking Trump’s character.113 It should be noted, Hillary Clinton’s campaign also missed the 
opportunity to campaign and run ads in states like, Wisconsin and Michigan, thus giving pro 
Trump interest groups such as, the NRA a more diverse strategy to appeal to voters.114 The NRA 
appealed to vulnerable women at home alone and to the soldiers who fought in Benghazi. This is 
all to show Hillary is unfit to serve as president because she will not protect fellow Americans. 
Ad hominem ads work to sway voters because the ads and the candidates themselves do not 
receive backlash from voters.115 This is in part due to two things, the backlash effect discussed 
earlier and voter agreement with the ad itself.  Voters either agreed with the ad and its portrayal 
of Hillary, or liked the fact pro Trump political action committees were able to wage those kinds 
of attacks.116  
All of this created the perfect environment for the NRA to use an electoral oriented 
donation strategy to push Donald Trump. According to Fowler, Ridout and Franz, the NRA ran 
9,638 ads, amounting to $11.1 million in 2016.117 By comparison, the NRA ran 7,451 more ads 
in 2016 than 2012.118 In 2016, the NRA deployed an electoral oriented donation strategy which 
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in turn increased their chances of electing their preferred candidate into office. The NRA ran ads 
and these ads did not receive the backlash effect. Also, Trump remained ideologically consistent 
throughout his campaign.  In fact, Donald Trump made multiple speeches claiming he was the 
“2nd Amendment President.” The NRA knew how and where to spend their independent 
expenditures, at the same time mobilize and attract voters.  
As previous studies pointed out, interest groups, especially partisan interest groups, will 
allocate their campaign contributions based on how useful the donation will be to elect a 
candidate (electoral donation). In other words, interest groups want to maximize their electoral 
donation, so simply meeting with candidates to influence policy is not enough to win.  The NRA 
occupies a highly politicalized industry making them more likely to deploy an electoral donation 
strategy, over an access-oriented donation strategy. The NRA has access to the legislature as 
demonstrated in their efforts to restrict gun control legislation after the Sandy Hook Shooting. 
The NRA needed a candidate who they could endorse and at the same time could win the 
presidency. This can be accomplished by simply finding the right candidate who will align 
ideologically and remain consistent with the interest group’s policy objectives.  
Discussion:   
The Citizens United ruling allowed a plethora of interest groups to surface advocating for 
a variety of policies at the federal level. Citizens United permitted money to flow freely from 
interest groups (and corporations) to candidates, then back to voters in the form of television ads 
explicitly calling for the defeat of a candidate. One of those interest groups who donates to 
political campaigns and runs ads is the NRA. Despite major mass shootings in the United States, 
the NRA managed to shift the discussion away from gun control by spending money on lobbying 
efforts, campaign contributions and ads during election cycles.  




The NRA spent more in total contributions and independent expenditures in the 2012 
Presidential Election.  However, Mitt Romney was not ideologically aligned with the NRA. 
Thus, the NRA had a hard time running ads supporting Romney’s stance on guns. As a result, the 
NRA changed their donation strategy stressing access to the legislature and passing pro-gun 
legislation through Congress. In 2012, the NRA could not deploy an electoral donation strategy 
to win the presidency, which is the preferred method for ideological and partisan interest groups.  
With Obama winning the 2012 Election, the NRA needed to find a candidate that was 
ideologically aligned with them and a candidate they could endorse. In 2016, the NRA backed 
Donald Trump, but spent less in total contributions and independent expenditures. By backing a 
candidate who was ideologically aligned, the NRA was able to spend less in total contributions, 
instead relying on negative attack ads to demonstrate Trump’s stance on guns.  
This essay used a comparative case study of the NRA’s total contributions and 
independent expenditures, in the 2012 Presidential Election and the 2016 Presidential Election 
compared to the television ads the NRA deployed in both elections. This case study used 
contribution reports from the FEC, television ad data from Wesleyan Media Project, NRA 
television ads from the 2016 election, and analysis of negative ad campaigns to prove interest 
groups who deploy an electoral oriented donation strategy increase their chances of electing their 
preferred candidate into office.  
Conclusion:  
Previous literature stressed the importance of an electoral donation strategy over an 
access - oriented donation strategy. This is because Citizens United has drastically changed the 
way candidates and interest groups interact with one another to secure seats and pass legislation. 
Campaign contributions become a mechanism for informing voters of the policy positions of the 




candidates running for office. Citizens United raised contribution caps and increased the number 
of times a donor can contribute to the same candidate during an election cycle. This caused 
candidates to rely on the same wealth donors’ multiple times during an election cycle. Interest 
groups with a strong membership base, like the NRA can rely on other methods of electoral 
support. One of these methods is using money from the interest groups general treasury to fund 
advertisements explicitly advocating for one candidate over another. These ads shape the way 
candidates transmit valuable information to voters up and till Election Day.  
The NRA has access to the legislature, they simply want to win seats. One of the ways 
the NRA can win seats is to use issue ads to advocate for one candidate over another. The NRA 
deployed this strategy in the 2016 Presidential Election. In the 2016 Presidential Election, 
Donald Trump aligned ideologically with the NRA and never changed his position on guns. As a 
result, the NRA waged a negative ad campaign against Hillary to win electoral votes.  
Likewise, interest groups are policy maximizers, so they have an incentive to donate to 
candidates who align with the issue debate of the interest group. The NRA’s television ad 
strategy was to run ad hominem attack ads and contrast ads at the same time. These ads attacked 
Hillary’s policies and her leadership traits, but transmitted valuable information about Trump’s 
stance towards gun rights. The NRA contributed less money in 2016, but because Trump 
matched the issue debate of the NRA, the NRA felt confident Trump would win. The NRA 
contributed more money in 2012, but could not elect their preferred candidate because Mitt 
Romney did not match the issue debate of the NRA.  In 2012, Mitt Romney’s mixed stance on 
gun control caused the NRA to value an access-oriented approach. With two mass shootings 
bookending 2012, the NRA changed their focus from supporting Romney to pushing as much 
pro-gun legislation through Congress as possible. However, this changed in the 2016 Presidential 




Election. In 2016, the NRA felt comfortable deploying an electoral oriented donation strategy to 
elect their preferred. This proved contributions, an ideologically aligned candidate, and negative 
ads are more valuable to win votes than access to the legislature.   
The NRA occupies a highly politicalized industry. As previous literature stated, highly 
partisan and ideological interest groups have access to the legislative process, so winning 
electoral seats becomes more valuable for them. Hence, highly partisan interest groups will favor 
an electoral donation strategy over an access – oriented donation strategy. Likewise, partisan 
interest groups that fall on the extreme ends of the political spectrum are better able to advocate 
and represent their interests ahead of other groups. The NRA occupies a highly partisan industry; 
thus, they are able to receive better representation in the legislative process. The NRA is a 
partisan interest group, making them more likely to use an electoral donation strategy over an 
access-oriented donation strategy. The 2016 election demonstrated the ability for an interest 
group to find a candidate ideologically aligned, use their general treasury fund to pay for 
advertisements, with the ultimate goal of electing their preferred candidate into office who will 
champion the policy objectives of the interest group.   
The ability for interest groups to use an electoral oriented donation strategy to champion 
the policy objectives of their preferred candidate is accomplished through the use of 
advertisements that explicitly call for the defeat of a candidate. As a result of Citizens United 
interest groups could replay these advertisements multiple times on tv prior to and on Election 
Day. The second chapter of this thesis dives deeper into how campaign finance reforms meant to 
protect the electorate were struck down in favor of allowing more money to enter to fund issue 
advertisements, thereby polarizing the electorate along partisan lines.  
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 The intent of campaign finance reforms passed by Congress was to limit large sums of 
money from entering the political sphere, swaying candidates to cater to those who donated the 
most and often. However, each time Congress passed a law limiting money, the Supreme Court 
argued the law restricted freedom of speech during an election. The Supreme Court also argued 
that the law restricted the flow and access of valuable information transmitted to voters by 
candidates via media (tv, print or online). The most recent case being the 2010 Supreme Court 
decision Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United ruled money is a form 
of free political speech, therefore; corporations, labor unions, and interest groups can use money 
to express their opinion for a candidate of their choice. Furthermore, interest groups can donate 
unlimited sums of money to elect their preferred candidate into office by running independent 
expenditure advertisements on tv that explicitly advocate for their preferred candidate. This 
essay explores, “How does the proliferation of interest groups in the form of Political Action 
Committees impact campaign spending on media advertisements during an election cycle?” By 
the same token, this essay examines a number of theoretical frameworks explaining the evolution 
of why campaign finance laws are either expanded to significantly limit money from entering the 
electoral system, or curtailed to permit unlimited sums of money to enter on the basis campaign 
finance laws violate freedom of speech. These theoretical frameworks suggest, as interest groups 
increase spending on issue advertisements, the quantity of issues discussed decreases causing a 
polarized electorate. To further prove this hypothesis, this paper uses a comparative case study of 
the 2008 Presidential Election and the 2016 Presidential Election. This case study will show 
polarization increased from 2008 to 2016 due the sheer amount of money flowing into the 
electoral system as a result of Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission.  





 In 2010 the Supreme Court threw a magnet into the campaign finance reform arena 
polarizing the country and dividing electoral outcomes. In 2010, the Supreme Court heard the 
case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United ruled donations from a 
corporation/ interest group’s general treasury to fund media advertisements that explicitly  
advocate for or against a candidate is a form of free speech. Furthermore, campaign finance laws 
limiting advertisement expenditures effectively restricts the ability for an interest group to 
express their political opinion during an election cycle. The Supreme Court ruled corporate/ 
interest group donations (money) are a form of free speech, therefore; they deserve the same 
First Amendment protections as individuals receive under the Constitution. This dramatically 
altered the relationship between candidates and interest groups, giving interest groups with 
money unlimited access to the candidate running for office, thereby excluding a majority of the 
electorate. Moreover, this begs the question, “How does the proliferation of interest groups in the 
form of Political Action Committees impact campaign spending on media advertisements during 
an election cycle?”  
 To answer this question, this essay examines a number of theoretical frameworks that 
explain why campaign finance laws are either expanded by increasing the amount of money an 
individual can contribute, or curtailed by decreasing the amount of money an individual can 
contribute. Campaign finance laws are curtailed by equalizing the playing field between 
candidates and interest groups. Equalizing the playing field requires passing reforms that balance 
the public interest of preserving the electoral system, while at the same time, maximizing a 
candidate’s benefit of winning. This balance is hard to find, so Congress passed a series of 
campaign finance laws aimed at benefiting the electorate, by restricting the amount of money 




entering the electoral system. Although these laws appear to limit the amount of money entering 
the political system, they actually create loopholes in other areas. Specifically, allowing interest 
groups to claim donation caps are a barrier to freedom of speech during an election cycle. The 
Court argued campaign finance laws restrict freedom of speech, which became the rational for 
the Supreme Court to strike down campaign finance reforms. Examining the theoretical 
frameworks plus two elections will advance the hypothesis that as interest group spending 
increases on independent expenditure advertisements the quantity of issues discussed decreases, 
causing a polarized electorate.  
To demonstrate interest group spending increased and the quantity of issues discussed 
decreased, this essay utilizes the Supreme Court case Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission. Citizens United struck down important provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 electioneering clause. These provisions of the BCRA were invalidated in 
favor of maximizing freedom of speech. Citizens United also permitted unlimited sums of money 
to enter the electoral system from an interest group or corporation’s general treasury to fund 
independent expenditure advertisements (media advertisements) in favor of their preferred 
candidate. These ads explicitly advocated for one candidate, ran up and till Election Day, and 
were considered a form of free speech. As a result, the Court could do very little to regulate the 
timing of the ads.  Consequently, interest groups could air these ads multiple times during an 
election influencing the electorate’s opinions and pulling them to the extreme.  
 Furthermore, this essay uses a case study comparing the 2008 presidential election and 
the 2016 presidential election. This case study shows interest groups in 2008 focused their 
attention on Congressional races, instead of the presidency because Barack Obama and John 
McCain discouraged outside interest groups from running negative ads. Interest groups did not 




polarize the electorate in 2008, instead polarization occurred along racial, generational and 
policy lines. However, this was not the case for the 2016 presidential election, where interest 
group spending, increased on advertisements polarizing the electorate, along with controversies 
surrounding Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.  
 To understand how campaign finance reform has evolved over time, it’s important to 
understand the theories behind why campaign finance laws have been planted to grow, thus 
restricting money entering the electoral system, or have been trimmed permitting money to flow 
into the electoral system.  
Literature Review:  
 With this in mind, campaign finance reform is the trunk of the tree with the different 
branches representing the different theories of why campaign finance laws should either be 
curtailed or expanded. The first branch argues campaign finance laws restrict a person’s freedom 
of speech, and within freedom of speech lies the theory of deliberate democracy. Briefly, 
deliberate democratic theory argues donations to a political campaign create a forum where 
voters can freely express their political opinion towards a candidate, therefore; campaign finance 
laws restricting donations do not maximize free speech. While the deliberate democratic theory 
expands campaign finance laws, the elite democratic theory curtails them. The elite democratic 
theory argues money accumulated in economic sphere is separate from votes accumulated in the 
political sphere. Moreover, campaign finance laws keep these two spheres distinct. The second 
branch of campaign finance theory argues equality is the kernel of campaign finance reform. The 
input model argues campaign finance laws equalize the playing field between the unequal 
amounts of resources put into campaigns (money) and the fact money is used to advance political 
communication. Campaign finance laws must strike a balance between, “partisan interest 




reforms,” that benefit the candidate, and “public interest reforms,” that benefit the electorate. 
However, conflict occurs when laws are passed by Congress, but struck down by the Judiciary to 
maximize freedom of speech.  
Campaign finance laws are a violation of free speech because donations can be used as a 
mechanism for voicing an opinion about a candidate running for office. According to Pasquale, 
the Supreme Court justified striking down campaign finance laws on the basis they did not 
maximize freedom of speech during an election cycle. Moreover, deliberative democratic theory 
explains why the Supreme Court maximized freedom of speech over upholding campaign 
finance laws. Deliberative democracy tries to improve democratic processes by creating a 
[forum] where voters can communicate and reflect openly about political issues.119 The basic 
principle of this forum is freedom of speech.120 Furthermore, this forum allows the speaker and 
audience to cooperate towards responsible policymaking.121 The speaker must keep to the topic 
at hand, whereas, the audience must respect the different opinions of others.122 In other words, 
it’s a two-way street between the speaker and the audience. The audience listening has a right to 
hear multiple sides of the issue, then make an informed decision based on what they hear. 
Deliberative democracy stresses the importance of the voter as a means to cultivate a 
healthy political debate. In the Supreme Court case Buckley V. Valeo, limitations on expenditures 
by candidates/ committees, limitations on individual spending of $1,000 or more per individual/ 
group, limitations on expenditures by candidates from their personal fund, and caps on aggregate 
expenditures were declared unconstitutional as they violated freedom of speech.123  These 
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restrictions violated an individual’s right to voice their political opinion, even if that opinion was 
voiced through money. Restricting some forms of speech, but allowing and elevating others is a, 
“foreign,” concept to the First Amendment because the First Amendment guarantees the 
exchange of ideas in a democracy.124  In Buckley V. Valeo, the Supreme Court maximized free 
speech, instead of equalizing the playing field between the electorate and candidates.  
Equalizing the playing field between the electorate and candidates requires a clear 
separation between money and votes in the electoral system. According to Stohler, the elite 
model takes a conservative approach to free speech and argues campaign finance laws must keep 
money and votes separate. The elite model of democracy allows restrictions on certain types of 
speech that impede competition during an election.125 The elite democratic theory views 
restrictions on speech as, “institutionally bound,” in other words, speech receives protection 
consistent with the institution it’s a part of.126 By the same token, the institutionally bound 
approach compartmentalizes resources and activities into different social spheres. Money is 
accumulated in the economic sphere and votes are accumulated in the political sphere.127 A 
campaign finance regime that allows the transfer of money from the economic sphere into the 
electoral sphere, encourages candidates to cater to those with money over those who do not.128 
Campaign finance laws preserve and protect the institution of elections and the act of holding 
elections.129 Therefore, Congress can regulate speech if it impedes the ability for other social 
spheres, like the electoral sphere to operate equally.  
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 According to Gottlieb, equality becomes the central theme of campaign finance reform. 
Gottlieb argues the input model explains the intersection of democracy and campaign finance 
reforms.130 The input model seeks to explain campaign finance reform by examining inequality 
of election campaigns and inequality of political influence.131 Inequality of election campaigns is 
the tension between preserving the equality of citizens in a political system, on one hand, and 
inequality of wealth on the other.132 Unequal amounts of resources can manipulate the political 
system thus, the need for campaign finance laws increases dramatically.133 Inequality of political 
influence is the, “undue,” influence money has in the electoral system.134 Money in the political 
system is a double-edged sword. Money advances political communication which is protected by 
the First Amendment, but money is also regulated to protect the conflicting interests of the 
public.  
 Campaign finance reform is a careful balance between the competing interests of 
candidates and the electorate. This careful balance is explained by two competing theories of 
campaign finance reform; public interest theory and partisan interest theory. According to La 
Raja, public interest theory argues campaign finance reform emerges from public outcry over a 
situation that is, “unjust or undemocratic.”135 Public interest theory relies on a scandal that 
informs the public about corrupt behavior, stirs public opinion, and ultimately pushes elected 
officials to pass reforms.136 Campaign finance reform is pushed by a small group of elites who 
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see the system failing, develop a solution (reform), and push policymakers to pass a set of 
reforms to fix the problem.137  
 Not all reforms are in the interest of the public, some favor the candidate over the 
electorate. By the same token, La Raja calls this theory, “partisan interest theory.” Partisan 
interest theory argues reforms are pushed for the private gain of the candidate running for 
office.138 Candidates have an incentive to push for laws that minimize their cost of running for 
office and maximize their benefits of winning.139  Campaign finance laws limiting expenditures 
and political speech affect the candidate’s ability to communicate his or her policy agenda to the 
public.140 Furthermore, politicians will seek to decrease or increase campaign spending limits 
when they perceive their party losing or  winning.141 Partisan interest theory prioritizes the 
candidate’s interests over the electorate interests.  
 In an effort to curb campaign spending and prioritize the electorate’s interest, Congress 
passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). However, according to Sebold 
and Dowdle, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act benefited the contributor and the candidate, 
not the electorate.142 Hence, the BCRA became a partisan interest reform, not public interest 
reform.  The BCRA banned the use of soft money, but to compensate the BCRA raised the 
contribution limits for individual donors from $1,000 to $2,000 per candidate/ per election 
cycle.143 The BCRA also relaxed limits on aggregate spending. With these two provisions 
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relaxed, candidates had the perfect opportunity to cultivate a, “contributor pond.”144 A 
contributor pond allows candidates to solicit the same wealthy donor’s multiple times during an 
election cycle.145 Candidates catered to the interests of these donors because their ‘voice’ was 
“amplified by money,” and money pushes candidates to the finish line.146  
Consequently, these wealthy donors, according to La Raja and Schaffner, tend to lie on 
the ideological extreme ends of the party (either very liberal or very conservative). La Raja and 
Schaffner argue individual donors prefer to contribute to candidates that share the same political 
ideology rather than give to their political party.147 Active campaign donors tend to hold 
ideological extreme views and tend to be older, white, wealthy and male.148 As a result, the bulk 
money during an election cycle comes from this pool of donors.149 Conservative donors on the 
extreme end of the spectrum will give directly to candidates who align with their views, pulling 
the party to the right.150  This is because conservative donors view the party as too moderate.151 
Liberal donors will contribute to both the candidate and party, pulling both to the left.152 Simply 
put, the middle ground of donors and candidates begins to disappear, leaving the ideological ends 
of candidates and donors. 
Conservative and liberal donors finance candidates through donating to an interest 
group’s political action committee (PAC’s) and these PAC’s pull both parties to the ideological 
extreme ends. According to McKay, interest groups play a pivotal role in pulling both 
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conservative and liberal donors to opposite ends of the political spectrum. Political action 
committees prefer to donate to both parties.153 However, some PAC’s favor one party over 
another based on the group’s ideology.154 As the ideology of a contributor moves to the far right 
or left, the more likely the contributor will donate to a PAC, rather than lobby elected 
officials.155 Hence, ideology becomes a strong predictor and incentive for political contributions 
to PACs.  
Methodology:  
 This is a comparative case study examining campaign spending on media advertisements 
by Barack Obama’s campaign in the 2008 presidential election and Donald Trump’s campaign in 
the 2016 presidential election and an interest group closely aligned with him, the Great America 
PAC. This essay utilizes campaign expenditure reports compiled by Open Secrets: Center for 
Responsive Politics, specifically on media advertisements from 2008 and 2016 presidential 
elections. This essay also utilizes several sources including, one book and one journal article 
written about the 2008 Election explaining campaign spending, election laws at the time, and the 
causes of polarization. Likewise, this essay uses two journal articles examining Donald Trump’s 
political advertisement strategy and Hillary Clinton’s advertisement strategy. These two journal 
articles demonstrate why Trump won using his ads to persuade voters, and why Hillary lost due 
to her advertisement strategy.  This data concludes interest group spending decreased in 2008, 
but polarization increased because the electorate itself was splitting along racial, generational, 
and issue-oriented lines. Whereas, the 2016 presidential election interest group spending on 
independent expenditure advertisements increased, and polarization increased due to campaign 
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spending on media advertisements which aired multiple times reinforcing voter opinions, and an 
already divided electorate over the candidates themselves. This will advance the hypothesis that 
as interest groups increase spending on media advertisements funded by  independent 
expenditures, the quantity of issues discussed decreases, causing a polarized electorate. Finally, 
this essay uses one book and one journal article to advance the claim partisan media 
advertisements polarize the electorate and this polarization has only gotten worse due to the court 
case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission.  
The Supreme Court Case that Changed Campaign Finance Reform:  
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard the case Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission. Citizens United, a nonprofit Conservative corporation, produced and released a 
film called, Hillary The Movie. The Movie was released to the public in January of 2008 prior to 
the primary election between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.  Hillary The Movie was a 
documentary critiquing Hillary Clinton’s time as a Senator before she became a candidate in the 
2008 Presidential Primary.156 Moreover, Citizens United released the film in theaters, but 
increased the distribution of the film by making it available through video on demand 
services.157 This allowed people to watch the film at home for free. In order to pay for the on-
demand services, Citizens United paid Comcast $1 million to broadcast the film.158 Citizens 
United paid Comcast directly “from [their] political action committee funded by donations from 
individuals.”159 Citizens United decided to release the film thirty days before the primary 
election violating federal election law.  
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The Federal Election Commission banned the release of the film because Citizens United 
violated the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) electioneering clause. The 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s electioneering clause, “prohibits corporations from using 
their general treasury funds for “electioneering communications.”160 Electioneering 
communication is, “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly 
identified federal candidate made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary 
election.”161 It’s worth mentioning, electioneering communication is also called issue 
advertisements, and funded through soft money.162 Soft money is money donated to a political 
party for, “party building activities,” such as, voter registration drives, get out the vote events, 
and issue advertisements.163 Soft money is not subjected to FEC regulations because it is donated 
directly to a party and not the candidate.164  
Citizens United sued the FEC because Citizens United argued banning the film violated 
their First Amendment right. The Supreme Court agreed with Citizens United and argued, 
“speech is essential,” during an election because voters should acquire information from multiple 
sources to make an informed decision.165 Restrictions on political speech is protected by stating 
speech is subject to “strict scrutiny,” under the Constitution.166 Moreover, to restrict political 
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speech the government must prove the restrictions further a compelling interest of the 
government and the restrictions are narrowly tailored to accomplish those interests.167  
Here, the Supreme Court stated corporations/ unions have the same freedom of speech 
rights as individuals do under the First Amendment. Citizens United permitted money to flow 
from a corporation’s general treasury fund to elect their preferred candidate into office by 
running advertisements on tv, thereby influencing the public’s opinion and polarizing the 
electorate. Polarization within the electorate occurs for a variety of reasons such as, ideological 
differences, race, religion, socioeconomic statuses and advances in social media. This essay 
focuses on how campaign finance reforms allowed money to enter the political system through 
the use of interest group issue ads that advocate for their preferred candidate over the airwaves.  
Case Study:  
 The 2008 presidential election became a historic election, with the most racially and 
ethnically diverse electorate. It would also be the first where an African American man won the 
United States Presidency. However, the 2008 presidential election was costly. According to 
Open Secrets: Center for Responsive Politics, Barack Obama spent $729.5 million, and raised 
$745 million.168 Barack Obama was a, “unique candidate,” who had a compelling message for 
young, minority, and middle-class voters.169 McCain had a hard time connecting to voters 
because his campaign focused on maintaining former president George H.W Bush’s policies, 
which Obama sought to reverse.170 McCain also had a hard time raising money. John McCain 
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raised $368.1 million, and spent $333.4 million.171 McCain relied on public financing, and 
received $84 million via the U.S Treasury to run his presidential campaign.172   
On the other hand, Obama relied on private donations to fund his campaign. Private 
campaign donations symbolized the gift that kept on giving because Obama raised money and 
then spent it on advertising.173 By garnering private donations, he was able to turn down public 
financing, making him the first candidate to do so. By using raising money through private 
donations, Obama controlled his ad’s message and content. McCain’s campaign could not 
because he opted into the public finance system, giving the Republican National Committee 
control over his ads.174 By opting into the public financing system, he was also showing his 
support for the bill he co – sponsored, the McCain Feingold Act also known as the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002.175 Although this co – sponsorship showed his support for 
campaign finance reform, it also made him the black sheep of the Republican Party, thus the 
Party did not fully support him when he ran for president in 2008.  
Furthermore, the 2008 election saw interest group ad sponsorship decline and candidate 
ad sponsorship increase. Obama sponsored approximately 94% of his advertising and aired 
438,000 ads. Moreover, PACs sponsored around 4% of his ads.176 So, the need for a PAC to 
control the message and content of the ad dropped dramatically.177  By using his own campaign 
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money to sponsor political ads, Obama was entitled to the lowest rate charged by local tv 
stations.178 Moreover, Obama drowned out McCain with political ads in key states such as, 
Florida, Texas, Indiana, Wisconsin and Iowa.179 Barack Obama discouraged independent groups 
from running negative ads during his campaign because they had the potential to divide the 
country. Likewise, spending by independent groups plummeted from $442 million in 2004 to 
$200 million in 2008.180 Independent groups shifted their attention from the candidates to 
Congressional races.181  
When it came to issues the electorate cared about, the economy, Iraq and health care took 
front and center stage. Around 84% of Obama supporters favored a government sponsored health 
care system, whereas, 72% of McCain voters opposed it.182 The issue that saw the deepest 
polarization was the Iraq war, with 12% of Obama supporters favoring it. However, 72% of 
McCain supporters favored keeping troops in Iraq.183 Obama responded by addressing these 
issues in his ads. He focused on health care/ education 22% of the time, the economy 6% of the 
time, and taxes/ budget (defense spending) around 6% of the time.184 Since Obama controlled the 
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content and the messaging, he could diversify the issues presented in his ads. This was further 
exemplified in a 30 – minute informercial Obama ran on tv.  
In October 2008, Obama blitzed the airwaves with a 30-minute informercial. This 
informercial ran on every major tv network, CBS, MSNBC, FOX, BET, Univision and TV 
One.185 This informercial informed voters of Obama’s plan for the economy, health care and 
Iraq.  Obama introduces the audience to three families who are struggling to make ends meet. 
One, a stay-at-home mom whose husband works in a factory, but his job does not pay a living 
wage to pay the bills.186 To a husband and wife both retired. However, the husband had to come 
out of retirement to pay for his wife’s arthritis medication.187 To an older man whose job was 
shipped overseas, causing him to lose his pension.188 Obama promises to cut taxes for the 
wealthy, give small business tax credits for every person hired, stop tax credits for businesses 
that ship jobs overseas, fix rising health care costs and provide health care for the uninsured. 
Finally, Obama states he will reduce the defense budget for Iraq and put that money into schools, 
hospitals, and roads.189 This informercial touched on every issue facing America in 2008. Obama 
spent around $3 million on this informercial, garnering around 33.5 million viewers.190 This 
                                                      
185 Michael Nelson, “The Election of 2008 Chapter 8: “Campaign Finance: Fundraising and Spending in the 2008 
Elections,” by Marian Currinder, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington D.C, (2010), pg. 175.  
186 Barack Obama, “American Stories, American Solutions – 30 minute special,” Youtube, October 29, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtREqAmLsoA  
187 Barack Obama, “American Stories, American Solutions – 30 minute special,” Youtube, October 29, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtREqAmLsoA  
188 Barack Obama, “American Stories, American Solutions – 30 minute special,” Youtube, October 29, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtREqAmLsoA  
 
189 Barack Obama, “American Stories, American Solutions – 30 minute special,” Youtube, October 29, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtREqAmLsoA  
190 CBS/ AP, “33.5 Million Watched Obama’s Informercial,” CBS News, October 30, 2008, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/335m-watched-obamas-infomercial/  




informercial asked Americans to “choose hope over fear and unity over division,”191 which 
drove his campaign.  
By the same token, the electorate itself was already showing signs of polarization not 
only with policy issues, but along generational and racial lines. The 2008 presidential election 
saw an increasingly younger electorate, voting Democratic. Barack Obama garnered 66% of 
voters between the ages of 18 – 29 which made up 18% of the electorate in 2008. 192 Young 
voters supported him in numbers, with 95% of them voting for Obama.193 Around 95% of 
African Americans supported Obama, and 66% of Hispanics supported him.194 This election 
symbolized change conservative voters fought against in the 2016 presidential election.  
2016 Presidential Election:   
The 2016 presidential election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton marked an 
election with two candidates who had high name recognition, but vastly different policy goals. 
Donald Trump’s controversial policies on immigration, race-based attacks, his personal attacks 
against Hillary Clinton, North Korea, and sexual misconduct allegations made him a 
controversial candidate. Across the aisle, Hillary Clinton’s policies focusing on women, health 
care, and education. Hillary had her fair share of controversies polarizing the electorate from the 
FBI probe, Benghazi, e mail scandal, her husband’s affair, and her push for health care reform as 
First Lady. Between the controversies surrounding both candidates, the negative attention both 
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candidates received from voters, combined with their opposing policies, became the catalyst for 
polarization within the electorate.  
Polarization in 2016 was not only due to negative attention both candidates received from 
voters due to their controversies, but also attributed to the sheer amount of money entering the 
2016 election cycle. Money entering the 2016 election cycle came from candidates and interest 
groups to fund political advertisements. According to Open Secrets: Center for Responsive 
Politics, Donald Trump spent $194.9 million on media making up 57% of his expenditures.195 
Hillary Clinton spent $351.3 on media, making up 60.7% of her expenditures.196 Although 
Clinton spent more on media than Trump, Trump had the backing of Super PACs who used a 
variety of advertisement strategies to garner support. These strategies gave him the electoral 
advantage over Hillary Clinton.  
Repeated message exposure by interest groups gave him the electoral advantage because 
Pro Trump PACs diversified their approach to target voters. Pro Trump PACs used contrast ads 
to praise Trump, but challenge Clinton’s issues/ character. Trump PACs aired 37% of ads 
attacking Clinton’s issues/ record, and 53% attacking her character.197 Pro Trump PACs utilized, 
“issue appeals,” to garner support, by airing 21% positive ads and 41% negative ads.198 Hence, a 
mix of both positive and negative issue appeals. Trump PACs contrasted Trump’s issues with 
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Clinton’s around 8% of the time.199 One of those controversies Pro Trump PACs used against 
her was the Benghazi attack.  
One of the Pro Trump PACs running negative contrast ads was the Great America PAC. 
According to the Great America PAC’s website, they spent $2 million dollars to air an ad 
attacking Clinton’s handling of Benghazi.200 The ad was called, “Difference.” The ad depicted 
the wife of a Navy Seal who was killed in Benghazi. She says…, “Hillary’s response to 
questions from the State Department were a, “disgrace,” The difference is…. “we need a leader 
who is accountable and truthful to American people,” “That leader is Donald Trump,”201 This ad 
contrasts Clinton who is a “liar,” and Trump who will protect “fierce patriots,” overseas.202 Great 
America PAC aired this ad 171 times in 5 media markets, with the last airdate on November 8, 
2016; Election Day. Hence, voters were exposed to this ad on the exact date of the election.203  
Adding to the negativity produced by Pro Trump PACs, were the ads produced by 
Trump’s campaign. The Trump campaign’s first ad was called, “Immigration.”204 This ad aired a 
total of 1,047 and times in with 224 viewings in North Carolina, and 336 viewings in Florida.205 
This ad aired from August to October 22, 2016. 206 The ad shows two Americas; Hillary’s and 
Trump’s. In Hillary’s America the system is, “rigged,” against Americans, open borders, illegal 
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immigrants skipping the line.207 In Trump’s America the border is, “secure,” families kept 
“safe,” and terrorist kept out.208 This ad sought to reinforce and, “connect Clinton’s negligent 
policies to an immigrant crisis that promises to get worse if she is elected.”209 These ads tapped 
into the fear Clinton represents Obama’s “heir,” to the White House and it would be more of the 
same policies Conservatives disliked.210  
Trump could not have exploited feelings of anger/ fear without the Supreme Court case 
Citizens United. Citizens United allowed interest groups to spend unlimited sums of money to 
directly advocate for the defeat of a candidate through the use of media advertisements. These 
ads did not just play once, they replayed over and over again. These ads became a reinforcement 
mechanism reminding voters of their positions, moving voters to the extreme.211 This repeated 
message exposure increases polarization by, “bolstering the [voters] confidence and certainty in 
their already held positions.”212 This repeated message exposure can only be accomplished 
through money. Money allows interest groups and campaigns to push their issue/ candidate over 
the airwaves, causing inequalities between those who have resources to communicate their 
position and those who do not.213 As a result, interest groups with money such as, the Great 
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America PAC were able to run ads up and till Election Day pushing their candidate and issues of 
choice across the airwaves.  As interest groups accumulate money and use it to influence voter 
decisions by airing the same ad over and over again, voters will make a decision based on the 
limited amount of information they have.214 When voters receive repeated message exposure 
through political ads, it only reinforces their position, instead of challenging it.215 Likewise, this 
combined with the unlimited amount of money entering the electoral system caused deep divides 
among those who can influence policy decisions and those who cannot. This fissure has only 
grown causing the middle ground of voters to disappear, leaving exact polar opposites of the 
Democratic and Republican parties. Furthermore, this fissure explains in part why the electorate 
harbored such extreme opinions of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.  
Discussion: 
The Citizens United decision changed the way candidates, donors and interest groups 
interacted with one another. First the Supreme Court ruled interest groups/ corporations could 
use their general treasury to fund media advertisements which advocated directly for a candidate 
over the airwaves. Prior to Citizens United media advertisements could not air thirty days prior to 
a primary election and sixty days prior to a general election. However, after Citizens United the 
Supreme Court ruled independent expenditure ads were a form of free speech therefore; did not 
have to abide by federal election laws on the timing of the ads. Hence, these ads could repeat 
multiple times influencing voters up and till Election Day.  
By the same token, the Court ruled, donations (in unlimited sums) are a form of 
expressing one’s opinion about a candidate, thus deserves constitutional protections. The 
Supreme Court afforded interest groups the same constitutional protections individuals have 
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under the First Amendment; Freedom of Speech. This had lasting implications for election cycles 
because as interest groups increased their spending on issue advertisements, the quantity of 
issues discussed decreases, causing a polarized electorate.  
Moreover, in the 2008 presidential election Barack Obama discouraged interest groups 
from running ads on his behalf, thus interest groups focused their attention on Congressional 
races. Barack Obama also used private donations to fund his own political ads. Obama not only 
controlled the message and content of the ads, but could vary the subject matter of the ads 
themselves. Obama’s 30 - minute informercial touched on salient issues affecting Americans 
from the economy, to health care to the Iraq War. In other words, his ads did not repeat one issue 
consistently, it was a diverse set of topics. Polarization in 2008 came from within the electorate. 
The electorate was racially diverse, younger and supported Obama. John McCain garnered 
support from an older, less diverse voting population, making him less attractive to young/ 
minority voters.  
During the 2016 presidential election, interest groups had the ability to donate to a 
candidate of their choosing, use their general treasury to fund media advertisements that repeated 
multiple times acting as a reinforcement mechanism pushing voters to the extreme. While Pro 
Trump PACs such as the Great America PAC contrasted Trump’s policies with Clinton’s 
policies, Pro Clinton PACs focused on character attacks. By Pro Trump PACs contrasting his 
policies with hers, he was able to connect to voters through issue appeals. One of these issue 
appeals was an ad attacking Clinton’s mishandling of Benghazi. The ad reinforced Clinton will 
not protect American troops, but Trump will. This held true for Trump’s campaign where he ran 
an ad contrasting his policies on immigration with hers, showing her policies towards 
immigration would endanger Americans, but his would keep Americans safe. These ads 




appeared on tv hundreds to thousands of times, only to reinforce negative opinions about her. 
Furthermore, these ads caused two polar opposite views to develop within the electorate, those 
who hated her and those who loved her.  
Conclusion:  
Campaign finance reform splits into different branches arguing for two separate ways of 
regulating money in the electoral system. The first branch argues campaign finance laws (limits 
on expenditures and contributions) is a form of free speech, thus campaign finance laws should 
be relaxed to guarantee a voter’s ability to voice their political opinion. Simply put, campaign 
finance laws limiting the amount of money a person can donate restricts the person’s political 
opinion, thereby restricting a person’s First Amendment right. Furthermore, campaign finance 
laws should maximize free speech by lowering donation caps instead of curtailing it. Another 
branch of campaign finance reform argues laws that restrict donations keep money and votes 
separate. Money is accumulated in the economic sphere, votes in the electoral sphere and 
campaign finance laws keep these two spheres separate. Campaign finance reform became a 
question of equality; preserving the equality of citizens on one hand and the inequality of wealth 
on the other. Unequal resources cause inequalities, thus there’s a need for campaign finance laws 
to equalize the playing field between candidates, voters, and interest groups. This inequality 
splits into reforms that focus on the candidate and reforms that focus on the electorate. Reforms 
that focus on the candidate maximize the candidate’s chance of winning by increasing donation 
caps, translating to more votes. Reforms that focus on the public rely on a campaign finance 
scandal to inform the public of a wrongdoing thereby, fueling policymakers to pass reforms to 
benefit the electorate. Congress tried to pass reforms such as, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, but these reforms are not always in the public’s interest. The Bipartisan Campaign 




Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) banned the use of soft money, but raised individual spending limits 
and relaxing aggregate spending limits, allowing more money to enter the electoral system.  
 Likewise, in the 2008 presidential election the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
governed the relationship between candidates and interest groups so donations were capped for 
individuals and interest groups. Furthermore, the two candidates running, Barack Obama and 
John McCain, discouraged outside interest groups from funding their campaigns. Barack Obama 
relied on private donations, mostly through individuals donating in small amounts throughout his 
campaign. Whereas, John McCain relied on the public finance system to run his campaign. 
Barack Obama used the private donations to fund his political ads, giving him the control of the 
content and messaging of the ads. Interest groups in 2008 focused their attention and money on 
Congressional races. The 2008 presidential election was unique not only because Barack Obama 
relied on private donations, but because the electorate was divided along racial, generational and 
policy lines.   
 By the same token, the electorate grew increasingly democratic, racially diverse and 
younger. Barack Obama appealed to minority voters, women and young voters. African 
Americans and Hispanics were voting at higher rates and voting primarily Democratic. 
Moreover, voters were younger and made up a higher share of the population eligible to vote in 
2008. Furthermore, Obama campaigned on fixing health care, fixing the economy, and pulling 
troops out of Iraq. Whereas, McCain supported maintaining former President George W. Bush’s 
policies. Meanwhile, older and white voters supported McCain. This split in the electorate 
caused polarization in the 2008 presidential election.  
 The older, more conservative voting population who voted for John McCain in 2008, 
would vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Occurring after the Citizens 




United decision, the 2016 presidential election demonstrated the effects of unlimited sums of 
money entering the electoral system and used for media advertisements that explicitly advocate 
for the defeat of a candidate. The 2016 presidential election pitted two controversial candidates. 
Donald Trump used racially, ethnically, anti – immigrant charged comments, which fueled his 
campaign. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton’s e mail scandal, Benghazi, FBI investigations, and her 
husband’s affair made her a controversial candidate. Pro – Trump PACs, aired ads contrasting 
Hillary’s character with Trump’s character. One of those ads produced by the Great America 
PAC critiqued Hilary’s handling of the Benghazi attack, while at the same time, portraying 
Trump as a candidate who will protect American lives. Furthermore, Trump appealed to the 
emotions of fear and anger through his campaign ads and the ads produced by the PAC closely 
aligned with him, The Great America PAC.  
Likewise, Trump’s campaign ran ads showing the difference between his policies on 
immigration and her policies on immigration. Trump’s campaign ran one ad in particular called, 
“Immigration,” which contrasted Trump’s America with Hillary’s America. The ad used positive 
language to describe how Trump would keep Americans safe and used negative language to 
describe how Clinton’s America would be a repeat of Obama. The amount of money pouring 
into the ads, plus repeat message exposure of the ads, pulled the electorate to polar opposites.  
By examining the theoretical frameworks, the Citizens United decision, and the two presidential 
elections, this essay sought to explain why campaign finance laws have been adopted only to be 
struck down by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, when the Supreme Court does strike down 
campaign finance laws, they are only opening the door for more division within the American 
electorate.  




 The Citizens United decision opened the door for groups classified under the IRS tax 
code as, “501 c (4) social welfare organizations.”  These social welfare organizations have a 
limit on how much money they spend for political purposes. However, many of these social 
welfare organizations go over that amount and donate secretly to political action committees and 
super political action committees. These social welfare organizations are called dark money 
groups. Moreover, when they donate secretly to political action committees and super political 
action committees to fund issue advertisements, this is called dark money spending. The third 
and final chapter of this thesis explains dark money, dark money spending, traces the money 
dark money groups spending on issue advertisements, and shows why these negative and 
deceptive advertising by dark money groups reduces transparency during an election cycle.  
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Campaign finance reforms were passed and enacted by Congress to limit the amount of 
money entering the electoral system from donors (individuals, and later corporations), interest 
groups (PACs), and the candidates own personal funds. However, each time Congress passed 
campaign finance laws, the Supreme Court struck them down on the basis they violated the First 
Amendment (freedom of speech). The most recent example where the Supreme Court struck 
down campaign finance expenditure laws was the 2010 case, Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission. The Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission 
corporations, unions and interest groups use their general treasury to fund media advertisements 
that explicitly advocate for one candidate over another, and these advertisements can appear on 
tv up and till Election Day. Likewise, Citizens United ruled money is a form of free political 
speech, therefore; corporations, labor unions, and interest groups can use money to express their 
opinion for a candidate of their choice. This allowed organizations or interest groups who call 
themselves, “501 c (4)’s social welfare organizations,” to form and participate in the political 
process. These 501 c (4)’s can only spend a certain amount of their expenditures on political 
activity. However, many of these social welfare organizations donate over the amount by hiding 
how they receive donations and to whom they are giving the donations to. This is called dark 
money spending. This essay explores, “How does the proliferation of dark money groups impact 
transparency of political information during an election cycle?” I will examine a number of 
theoretical frameworks explaining how curtailed campaign finance permitted dark money groups 
to reduce transparency of political information, thereby causing negative and deceptive political 
advertisements to increase during an election cycle. This essay explores the impact dark money 




groups have on the electoral process, specifically on negative media advertisements. This essay 
uses two case studies; the 2012 presidential election and the 2018 Midterm Election to 
demonstrate how dark money groups have influenced the electoral process. The 2012 
presidential election demonstrates conservative dark money groups outspent liberal dark money 
groups in an attempt to sway the electorate to vote against Barack Obama’s health care plan. 
Although Obama won the 2012 presidential election, dark money groups took full advantage of 
the campaign finance laws allowing them to spend in unlimited sums to elect their preferred 
candidate into office. The second case study this essay utilizes is the 2018 Midterm Elections, 
specifically in Arizona. The 2018 Midterm Elections saw liberal dark money groups outspend 
conservative dark money groups, and dark money spending increase dramatically on negative 
and deceptive media advertisements since Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. 
Citizens United permitted money in unlimited sums to fund these negative and deceptive ads by 




























In 2010, the Supreme Court shined a dark cloud over campaign finance laws watering 
down transparency of political information during an election cycle. In 2010, the Supreme Court 
heard the case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United V. Federal 
Election Commission, permitted money to flow from a corporation’s general treasury fund to 
directly elect their preferred candidate into office. This allowed corporations with money to 
wield influence over public opinion by pushing their preferred candidate’s issues, while at the 
same time, influence the electoral process. Hence, giving donors unlimited access to the 
candidate’s campaign, thereby, excluding non - affluent voters from the political process. 
Likewise, the donors themselves did not have to disclose how or from whom they were receiving 
funds. This created a relationship where transparency between the donor, where and how the 
donor was receiving funds, the candidate and the voter was almost non – existent. This begs the 
question, “How does the proliferation of dark money groups impact transparency of political 
information during an election cycle?”  
I will answer this question by examining theoretical frameworks that explain why 
campaign finance reforms are passed in an attempt to distribute resources effectively and ensure 
the electorate has a voice in the political process.  These theoretical frameworks will further the 
hypothesis that curtailed campaign finance laws permitted dark money groups to reduce 
transparency of political information, causing negative and deceptive political advertisements to 
increase during an election cycle. On that note, campaign finance laws preserve and protect the 
economic sphere and the political sphere. Campaign finance laws ensure money stays in the 
economic sphere, votes in the political sphere. Moreover, campaign finance laws regulating 




speech keep these spheres separate, while at the same time preserving the act of holding 
elections. The kernel of campaign finance reform is a question about equality, equality of 
citizens and the inequality of resources in the political system.  Ideally, campaign finance reform 
balances wealth inequalities.  However, campaign finance laws have been altered to favor the 
candidate’s interest (wealth) over the public interests. Campaign finance reforms under Buckley 
V. Valeo, had unintended consequences of allowing more money to enter the electoral system, 
not less. Campaign finance laws were further scaled back when Congress passed the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 increased the 
total amount of times a donor can give during an election cycle. This allowed wealthy donors to 
contribute multiple times during an election cycle, therefore; shrinking the pool of donors.  
This slow curtailment of campaign finance laws by the Supreme Court culminated with 
the conical case, Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United V. Federal 
Election Commission allowed corporations, unions and interest groups to spend unlimited sums 
of money from their general treasury on media advertisements that directly advocate for one 
candidate over another. The Supreme Court effectively stated political spending by corporations/ 
unions, and interest groups is a form of free speech and corporate entities have the same freedom 
of speech rights as individuals. This allowed wealthy corporations, unions and interest groups to 
find new ways to donate money. One of these new ways is through dark money.  Dark money is 
donated by social welfare organizations (501 c (4)) who cannot spend a majority of their 
expenditures on political activities and are not required to disclose the identities of their donors. 
These dark money groups through political action committees and super political action 
committees can run tv ads to elect their preferred candidate into office. This essay explores two 
election cycles where dark money spending reached an all-time high. During the 2012 




presidential election, dark money spending skyrocketed with the aim to persuade the electorate 
that Barack Obama’s health care plan increases taxes. During the 2012 presidential election one 
of the main conservative dark money groups operating was, “Americans for Prosperity.” 
Americans for Prosperity launched an ad campaign targeting Obama’s health care plan, the ad 
was deceptive and contained misinformation. Obama won in 2012, but this election opened the 
flood gates for dark money groups to increase their spending in the 2018 Midterm Election. The 
2018 Midterm Election saw the reverse, with liberal groups outspending conservative ones. The 
2018 Midterm Election in Arizona saw the liberal group, “Majority Forward,” blitz the airwaves 
to elect Kyrsten Sinema over Martha McSally. Kyrsten Sinema won, Martha McSally lost, 




  Campaign finance reform has evolved into a question about equality of resources and 
how those resources should be used to effectively communicate the candidate’s message, while 
at the same time, ensuring voters are receiving transparent political information during an 
election cycle. The court case campaign finance scholars use to come to a theoretical 
understanding of why campaign finance reform is complex is Buckley V. Valeo. Buckley V. 
Valeo demonstrates the struggle between equality of resources (money) in the electoral sphere 
and transparency of political information provided to voters during an election cycle.  
 Campaign finance laws ensure citizens have a voice in the political process. Moreover, 
their voice in the political process is the ability to vote, regardless of how much wealth they 
accumulate in society. According to Stohler, the elite model of democracy explains how 
campaign finance reforms keep money and votes separate in the electoral system. The elite 




model allows restrictions on speech if that speech impedes competition during an election 
cycle.216 The elite model views certain restrictions on speech as, “institutionally bound,” in other 
words, speech receives protection consistent with the institution it’s a part of.217 The elite model 
argues this approach, the, “institutionally bound approach,” compartmentalizes resources into 
different spheres. In campaign finance law, the two spheres are money and votes. These spheres 
cannot intersect or inadvertently influence each other. Since votes provide little currency in other 
spheres of life, no citizen occupying space in once sphere can be, “undercut,” by standing in 
another sphere.218 If the electoral system is structured in such a way permitting some voters to 
have greater influence over others, candidates will cater to those who have greater wealth.219 The 
elite model of democracy argues corporate involvement in elections allows resources in the 
economic sphere influence votes in the electoral sphere.220 Likewise, allowing those two spheres 
to collide undermines the position of other interests, such as non-affluent voters. Furthermore, 
campaign finance laws regulating expenditures preserves the equality of the political process.  
 The kernel of campaign finance reform is a question of equality; equality of citizens and 
the unequal influence money has in the electoral system. According to Gottlieb, equality 
becomes the explanation why campaign finance reforms are necessary in the electoral system. 
Gottlieb calls this the input model.221 The input model seeks to explain campaign finance reform 
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as a balancing act between equality of citizens and inequality of political influence.222 Unequal 
amounts of resources (money) manipulates the political system to favor the wealthy. As money 
enters the system, the need for campaign finance laws to equalize the playing field between 
candidates, donors and voters increases.223 Moreover, the inequality of political influence, is the, 
“undue,” influence money as in the political system.224 This is where the paradox lies. Money 
allows candidates to cater to wealthy donors who contribute the most, but money is also used as 
a vehicle to communicate the candidate’s platform to voters. However, money is also regulated 
at the pursuit of, “competing public interests.”225 Money is used for negative and positive 
outputs. Likewise, campaign finance reforms are needed to balance the equality of citizens and 
inequality of resources in the system.   
If balanced incorrectly, the competing interests of the candidate and donor will outweigh 
the competing interest of the public. According to Overton, campaign finance reforms that put 
the candidates interests over the electorates interests fall into two approaches. The first approach 
is called the class blind approach.226 The class blind approach stresses the private interest of the 
candidate over the public interest of curbing massive amounts of money in the political 
system.227 Using the class blind approach, politicians seek political power and capitalize on 
wealth disparities to gain influence in the political system.228 This approach rejects campaign 
finance reform and argues wealthy individuals should not experience discrimination just because 
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they have the means to donate.229 Hence, non – affluent individuals do not face discrimination 
because they do not have the means, so why should wealthy individuals endure 
discrimination?230  
 Completely opposite the class blind approach is the class sensitive approach. The class 
sensitive approach argues campaign finance laws increases political participation amongst non – 
affluent voters.231 Large campaign contributions from a small concentrated group of wealthy 
donors threatens democratic participation.232 Campaign finance laws correct the disparities in 
political participation, caused by massive disparities in wealth distribution in the economic 
system.233  Moreover, contribution limits prevent the, “undue,” influence of money in the 
electoral system.234 The class sensitive approach acknowledges non affluent voters do not have 
access to large sums of money to donate to candidates, thus campaign regulation is necessary to 
overcome this problem.  
 Consequently, campaign finance laws have unintended consequences that actually 
increase money in the electoral system, rather than regulate it. Restrictions on individual 
contributions and political action committee spending was the center of the Supreme Court case, 
Buckley V. Valeo. Briefly, Buckley V. Valeo ruled limitations on expenditures by candidates/ 
committees, limitations on individual spending of $1,000 or more per individual/ group, 
limitations on expenditures by candidates from their personal fund, and caps on aggregate 
expenditures were declared unconstitutional because they violated an individual’s freedom of 
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speech during an election cycle.235 Instead of curbing the amount of money entering the electoral 
system, Sunstein argued Buckley V. Valeo diverted donations from hard money which is 
regulated by the Federal Election Commission to soft money, which is not regulated by the 
Federal Election Commission.236 
 Sunstein argued campaign finance laws have unintended consequences that result in more 
money entering the electoral system, causing inequalities for non-incumbent candidates and 
voters alike. The first unintended consequence is campaign finance laws allow incumbents to 
accumulate money quickly from donors the incumbent will likely stay close to.237 This leaves the 
challenger with little room to win. Second, limits on individual spending will funnel money away 
from individual donors to political action committees.238 Resources will shift to political action 
committees because they are loosely regulated.239 Third, restrictions on hard money donations 
will cause an increase in the use of soft money.240 Soft money is not regulated by the Federal 
Election Commission, allowing money to enter the electoral system through another channel.   
Fourth, restrictions on political action committees encourage donors to influence a 
specific lawmaker with the clear intention of receiving something in return (quid pro quo).241 
Fifth, restrictions on political action committees hurt organized labor and minority candidates 
who depend on political action committees to campaign for them. Political action committee 
(PAC) limitations push minority and organized labor out of the electoral sphere.242  Hence, 
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wealthy and white candidates run for office garnering contributions from wealthy and white 
donors. Furthermore, the donors and candidates do not represent the majority of the electorate.  
Finally, restrictions on political action committees increase, “secret gifts,” i.e., ‘dark 
money.’ Political Action Committees offer candidates soft money, thereby becoming an 
assembly line of money from an unidentified source.243 Laws restricting political action 
committees makes it harder to identify the source of money without decreasing funding from 
special interests.244  
When campaign finance laws permit more money to flow into the electoral system for 
political communication, voters learn more about one candidate than they do the other. 
According to Blasi, if elections are driven by fundraising, certain kinds of skills, priorities and 
attitudes are over represented.245 When campaign finance reforms favor more money entering the 
system, financial constituencies compete for geographic constituencies. Hence, elected officials 
respond to their donors and become unresponsive to their constituents who they represent.246 
Campaign finance reforms ensure candidates respond to constituents, not their donors. When 
candidates solicit the same wealthy donors and win elected office, they create an open line of 
communication between themselves and the donors.247 This open line of communication causes 
the candidate to cater to their financial constituencies.248 Likewise, campaign finance laws curb 
the exchange between the candidate’s donors and the constituents they serve.249 Blasi argued the 
time a candidate must spend to fundraise evolved from the, “legislative patchwork,” created after 
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Buckley V. Valeo.250 Buckley V. Valeo set limits on hard money donations, but left soft money  
alone.251 Buckley V. Valeo also banned candidates from using their personal funds to fund their 
campaigns. This created a gap between candidates who used their personal funds to get ahead 
and candidates who could not use their personal funds.252 Moreover, campaign finance laws 
permitting the use of a candidate’s personal funds close the gap and promote financial 
equality.253 Blasi argued spending limits should apply universally, thus reducing the chance of 
wealth disparities amongst candidates.254  
Congress in an attempt to curb the inequality of large sums of money entering the 
electoral system, passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). According to 
Sebold and Dowdle, the BCRA reduced wealth inequalities by banning the use of soft money. 
The BCRA banned soft money, but increased the legal limit a contributor can give to a candidate 
during an election cycle.255 The legal limit a contributor can give was increased from $1,000 to 
$2,000.256 Furthermore, the Supreme Court increased the aggregate spending limit because these 
limits restricted the ability for contributors to donate as many times as they wanted to voice their 
opinion for a candidate.257 With the legal contribution limit increased and the aggregate spending 
limit increased, candidates had the perfect opportunity to cultivate a, “contributor pond.”258 A 
contributor pond allows candidates to solicit the same wealthy donor multiple times during an 
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election cycle.259 When candidates cater to wealthy donors, their voice is, “amplified by money,” 
thus allowing them to voice their opinions.260 This ‘contributor pond,’ has allowed wealthy 
donors to discourage political participation by non – affluent voters, causing deep wealth 
disparities to develop in the political process.  
The Catalyst: Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission: 
 The catalyst that deteriorated campaign finance laws and permitted even more money to 
flow into the electoral sphere was the 2010 Supreme Court case, Citizens United V. Federal 
Election Commission. Citizens United, a nonprofit Conservative corporation, released a film 
called, Hillary The Movie. The Movie was released to the public prior to the 2008 primary 
election between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.261 Hillary the Movie was a documentary 
criticizing Hillary Clinton’s time as a Senator before she made ran for president in 2008.262 
Citizens United decided to release the film in theaters, and make the film available for free to the 
public via video on – demand services.263  However, Citizens United paid to broadcast the film 
via video on – demand services. Citizens United paid Comcast $1 million to broadcast the film, 
directly, “from [their] political action committee funded by donations from individuals.”264 
Consequently, Citizens United decided to release their film thirty days prior to the primary 
election violating federal election law.  
 The Federal Election Commission banned the release of the film because Citizens United 
violated the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) electioneering clause. The 
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Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s electioneering clause, “prohibits corporations from using 
their general treasury funds for “electioneering communications.”265 Electioneering 
communication is considered, “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a 
clearly identified federal candidate made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a 
primary election.”266 Electioneering communication is another way of saying tv advertisements 
explicitly advocating for one candidate over another and is funded primarily through soft money.  
 Once Citizens United realized their film was banned, they sued the FEC. The Supreme 
Court heard the case in 2010, hence Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. When the 
Supreme Court heard the case, they agreed with Citizens United. The Court argued, “speech is 
essential,” during an election because voters should acquire information from multiple sources to 
make an informed decision.”267 The Court said, banning the movie, “effectively restricts the 
number of issues discussed, the quantity of expression, and the size of the audience reached.”268  
In a democracy, speech must be protected because it holds elected officials accountable to the 
people they serve.269 The Court agreed, the First Amendment permits more speech, not less. 
Moreover, the Court felt Citizens United was providing the public with, “insightful information 
about a candidate,” or, some citizens might fight this, “intrusive.” This decision is not for the 
government to make, it’s for the voters to make.270 Voters must be free to obtain information 
from a variety of sources before they cast their ballot and this is crucial during an election cycle.  
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 The Supreme Court stated Citizens United was simply voicing their opinion against 
Hillary Clinton and they have a right to do so. The First Amendment protects all kinds of speech, 
including political speech which in the Court’s view includes money. The Court defended a 
corporation’s right to use money as a form of political speech by stating, “The First Amendment 
protects political speech and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of 
the corporate entities in a proper way.”271 Simply put, a corporation, has the same freedom of 
speech rights as individuals do under the First Amendment. With this ruling, Citizens United 
permitted money in unlimited sums to flow from a corporation’s general treasury fund to elect 
their preferred candidate into office by running advertisements on tv, thereby influencing the 
public’s opinion. Corporations and interest groups can do this because their donations are 
protected and considered a form of free speech.  
Methodology: 
 This essay is a comparative case study of two election cycles; both exhibiting a 
significant increase in dark money spending and a unique pattern of spending. This essay 
compares the 2012 presidential election where conservative dark groups outspent liberal dark 
groups and the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona, where liberal groups outspent conservative 
groups. This comparative case study will prove as a result of curtailed campaign finance laws, 
dark money groups reduced transparency of political information, thereby causing negative and 
deceptive political advertisements to increase during an election cycle. The 2012 presidential 
election saw conservative dark money groups increase their spending dramatically on 
advertisements, one in particular, that contained misleading information regarding Barack 
Obama’s push for health care reform. Although Obama won in 2012, dark money groups 
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continued to donate money and push candidates in the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona. In the 
2018 Midterm Elections, liberal groups outspent conservative groups showing dark money 
spending does not discriminate based on political ideology. Instead, dark money groups run 
negative ads and these ads are primarily deceptive. When outside interest groups run negative 
ads, the link between the candidate and the voter disappears, thus transparency decreases and the 
candidate escapes negative evaluations from voters.  
The two dark money groups this essay uses self – report their political spending to the 
Federal Election Commission. Keep in mind, dark money groups do not disclose their donors to 
the FEC, so, some of the data are estimates. This essay utilizes data from Open Secrets: Center 
for Responsive Politics who compiles contribution and expenditure reports from the FEC. The 
FEC data (retrieved from Open Secrets), labels expenditures from Americans for Prosperity as, 
“outside spending,” showing how much they spent against Democrats in 2012. Moving to 
another tab, “targeted candidates,” shows how much money Americans for Prosperity spent 
against Barack Obama. This this essay uses the book Dark Money by Jane Mayer detailing 
Americans for Prosperity’s money trail and their push to oppose Obama Care.  
This format follows for Majority Forward, the Democratic dark money group operating 
during the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona. Likewise, the FEC labels expenditures as, “outside 
spending.” showing how much they spent against former Republican Senator Martha McSally of 
Arizona. Similarly, Majority Forward has a tab called, “targeted candidates,” showing how much 
money Majority Forward spent to elect the Democrat Kyrsten Sinema over Martha McSally. 
Majority Forward ran attack ads against McSally’s goal to end the ACA, showing dark money 
groups will use negative ads to persuade voters, regardless of the cost to the electorate.  




This essay uses data from a variety of think tanks doing academic research in the field of 
dark money and its impact on transparency. One of the think tanks is Issue One. Issue One 
compiles reports on which dark money groups report their expenditures and how many donors 
gave to these groups (no names of donors). Annenburg Public Policy Center compiled a donor 
profile and summary of Americans for Prosperity. Finally, the Sunlight Foundation compiles 
data on the candidates who benefited the most from dark money spending.  
Due to the nature of dark money spending (non-disclosure of donors), this essay utilizes 
news outlets including Politico, Vox.com, Time, and Arizona Central to gain current information 
dark money spending on political ads and what policy issues were in the ad. This essay also 
utilizes two academic journal articles showing how negative political ads directly affects 
accountability and transparency between the interest group, candidate and electorate.  
The Dark Money Problem:  
 Citizens United changed the way candidates solicit donations from donors, and how 
donors disclose where they were receiving funds. Contributors have a variety of ways they can 
donate to support a candidate. First, a contributor (candidate committee, political party or 
political action committee (PAC)) can give a “hard money,” donation where there are 
contribution limits, the donor’s name and amount must be disclosed to the Federal Election 
Commission, and the donor can organize to help elect a candidate provided the donor does not 
contribute directly to the candidate.272 Second, a contributor can give a, “soft money,” donation. 
Soft money is considered donations from individuals, outside groups like, corporations, interest 
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groups and unions. These donations can be given to the candidate for, “direct political activities,” 
like issue advertisements, get out the vote drives, phone banking, and canvassing.273  
By the same token, some outside groups are required to disclose their donors, but some 
do not have to and this is where the complexity lies. The outside groups that do not have to 
disclose their donors are called, “dark money groups.” These dark money groups are primarily 
501 c (4)’s which are social welfare organizations and can engage in political activity to an 
extent.274 However, 501 c (4)’s may not make political activities their primary purpose of their 
organization. However, this is not enforced.  501 c (4) social welfare organizations may devote 
49.9% of their expenditures to political activities and these expenditures are not reported to the 
IRS.275 Realistically, these dark money groups spend way more money on political activities 
than 49.9%.   
Dark money groups can influence elections in a few ways; they can buy ads themselves 
or they can give money to a super political action committee (super PAC) who will buy the ad on 
behalf of the dark money group. As a result of the Citizens United, super PACs can accept 
donations in unlimited sums from interest groups, corporations, and individuals.276 Super PACs 
must disclose their donors, but many do not have to provide information regarding who supports 
the Super PAC. Both Super PACs and 501c (4) organizations are not allowed to contribute 
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money directly to candidates. Super PACs are exempt from fundraising limits because they 
cannot donate directly to the candidate and must disclose donors.277  
 The problem then becomes dark money groups can buy ads, run those ads up and till 
Election Day, and voters do not know who is running the ad. Moreover, these donors tend to be 
wealthy and donate in large sums to elect their preferred candidate. However, these wealthy 
donors do not want to disclose their name, so they donate to dark money groups who will funnel 
their donation to the candidate of their choice.278 Moreover, it becomes an issue of transparency. 
Voters cannot hold candidates accountable to their message and actions, thus the electorate does 
not have a fair chance to make an informed decision.279 The problem of dark money got worse 
after Citizens United during the 2012 presidential election between Barack Obama and Mitt 
Romney.  
2012 Presidential Election: 
 The 2012 Presidential Election between Barak Obama and Mitt Romney marked the 
highest amount of dark money spending after Citizens United. According to Open Secrets: 
Center for Responsive Politics, dark money spending accounted for $308.7 million, with 
conservatives making up 85% of dark money expenditures.280 During the 2012 Presidential 
Election, conservatives outspent liberals at a rate of 7 to 1 on negative advertising.281 
Conservatives spent around $55 million attacking Obama, with positive Obama ads and negative 
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Mitt Romney ad spending around $12 million.282 These dark money groups worked behind the 
scenes to oppose Barack Obama’s health care plan.  
 The hot button issue in 2012 was the Affordable Health Care Act. The Affordable Health 
Care Act expanded health care coverage to those above the poverty level, but do not qualify for 
Medicaid, non – pregnant adults, non – disabled adults, those with a preexisting health 
conditions and those living in states that did not expand Medicaid.283 The ACA became a 
contested piece of legislation from day one.  
Prior to the 2012 Presidential Election in March, the Supreme Court heard the case 
National Federation of Independent Business, et al. V. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, et al. which challenged the individual mandate of the ACA. The individual 
mandate required non – exempt individuals who did not purchase health care through the ACA 
to pay a tax penalty.284 This individual mandate would start in 2014. The National Federation of 
Independent Business argued the mandate exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and the 
Medicaid expansion was, “constitutionally coercive.”285 The Supreme Court ruled against the 
National Federation of Independent Business stating, the individual mandate did not violate 
Congress’s power to tax. Furthermore, spending on Medicaid expansion did not violate the 
Constitution; thus, the law was upheld and the ACA would move forward.286   
This did not sit well with Republicans who opposed it. With Citizens United in the 
background of campaign finance legislation, dark money groups got the green light to raise and 
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spend money, “without impunity,”… “both the legal and political stigma lifted.”287 The 2012 
Presidential Election saw an exponential increase in dark money spending, these are interest 
groups that do not disclose their donors to the public.288 One of the dark money groups who 
strongly opposed the ACA was a dark money group, “Americans for Prosperity.”  
Americans for Prosperity is a conservative social welfare organization classified under 
the tax code as a 501 c (4) which means they do not have to disclose their donors and only spend 
49% of their expenditures on political activity. This is not what occurred. Instead, Americans for 
Prosperity spent 91.55% of their total revenue on, “independent expenditures,” which includes 
issue advertisements.289 Americans for Prosperity spent a total of $36,637,579 on outside 
spending for the 2012 Election, with $33,542,051 spent against Obama.290 Americans for 
Prosperity is one out of fifteen dark money groups that has self – reported to the FEC their 
political spending. According to Issue One, they have reported around 14% of their political 
spending to the FEC.291 Americans for Prosperity also reported to the FEC 100% of their 
political spending was on negative issue advertising.292  
Furthermore, Americans for Prosperity launched a television ad campaign showing the 
consequences of Obama’s health care plan. Americans for Prosperity spent $9 million on an ad 
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campaign targeting Obama Care. Americans for Prosperity called it, “one of the biggest tax 
increases in history,” and voter must be reminded of, “the disastrous components of this 
legislation.”293 Americans for Prosperity held a summit before the vote on the ACA. They had 
Randy Kendrick speak on surviving a bad knee injury, without being confined to a wheelchair. 
She became convinced if the United States adopted, “government sponsored health care, she 
would be dead.”294 Randy Kendrick became the point person for Americans for Prosperity. She 
began equating the good health care she received in the U.S, with the bad government care if she 
were living in Canada or the United Kingdom.295 This comparison between U.S. health care as 
good, and universal health care as bad continued in the ads Americans for Prosperity ran 
nationally. Negative and deceptive ads by dark money groups, accounted for 20% of American 
for Prosperity political spending in 2012.296  
One of the negative ads Americans for Prosperity ran against Obama in 2012 (the ad’s 
launch date was March 12, 2010) was called, “Hands off.” The ad features a woman who 
survived breast cancer because she went to her doctor for a mammogram. She says, “early 
detection saved my life,” “a government panel tasked with creating guidelines on mammogram 
screenings stating women over 50 don’t need them,” “If the government takes over health care, 
these recommendations could become law, causing all kinds of diseases.”297 She compares 
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Europe’s breast cancer survival rate of 79% with the United States of 90%. She then says, “what 
are the odds if the government takes over your health care?”298  The ad is sponsored by 
handsoffmyhealthcare.com and says paid for by, “Americans for Prosperity.” Americans for 
Prosperity ran other anti – Obama Care ads, sponsored by varies front groups. These front groups 
included; Center to Protect Patient Rights garnering $13 million in donations, another $10 
million passed through 501 c (4) organizations to Americans for Prosperity, and Patients United 
Now responsible for organizing over 300 anti – Obama Care rallies across the United States.299 
Dark money creates an environment of, “deliberate misinformation,” about a policy issue.300 The 
ad misleads voters by skewing the breast cancer survival rates in Europe and the U.S. Note, the 
breast cancer survival rates hover around 88% and 86 – 85% for the U.S and Europe 
respectfully.301  
Although the ad says it’s paid for by Americans for Prosperity, voters do not know who 
is funding the ad, how much was spent, and how accurate the information is portrayed. Dark 
money groups “infused massive amounts of money [and] they got disproportionate amount of 
influence.”302 According to Issue One, twenty - nine donors to Americans for Prosperity 
accounted for $154,654,879 of their total revenue.303 These twenty – nine donors were able to 
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control the public agenda on Obama’s health care plan through ads and front groups, while, 
hiding their true identities.304 Dark money waged a new form of a permanent campaign, “not by 
politicians, but by people’s whose wealth gave them the ability to fund their own private field 
operations to undermine the outcome of an election.”305 Although Obama won despite 
Americans for Prosperity’s efforts, the 2012 Presidential Election was the first storm dark money 
waged. The second storm of dark money occurred during the 2018 Midterm Elections.  
2018 Midterm Elections 
The 2018 Midterm Elections demonstrated reverse dark money spending. Meaning, 
liberal dark money groups outspent conservative dark money groups, with liberal groups 
accounting for 54% and conservative groups account for 31%.306  The 2018 Midterms saw dark 
money spending increase to $405 million, $100 million more than in 2012.307 Similarly, 50% of 
political spending in the 2018 Midterm Elections came from dark money groups that do not 
disclose their donors.308 In 2018, one of the dark money groups donating in record sums was the 
liberal group, Majority Forward. Majority Forward spent a grand total of $40,273,232 in the 
2018 Midterm Election, and spent $37 million to unseat Republican candidates running for the 
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Senate.309 One of the candidates Majority Forward fought to unseat was former Arizona Senator 
Martha McSally. According to Open Secrets Center for Responsive Politics, Majority Forward 
poured $6,963,924 to lobby against her and elect the Democratic Senator Kyrsten Sinema.310 
Majority Forward is affiliated with Senate Majority PAC, which is connected to Senate Majority 
leader Chuck Schumer.311 Majority Forward is the only dark money group operating in Arizona 
during the midterms, using the Democratic group, “Red and Gold,” to run ads against Martha 
McSally.312 Red and Gold is funded by George Soros.313  
Majority Forward, specifically Red and Gold, poured money into attack ads to unseat 
Martha McSally. Majority Forward spent $40 million in media, around $38 million in 
unspecified media buys.314 Given Majority Forward is a dark money group, they used an 
intermediary to buy their ads, that group was Red and Gold. Red and Gold PAC spent $2.96 
million in ads against Martha McSally.315 Majority Forward, Senate Majority PAC, and Red/ 
Gold flooded the airwaves ahead of the midterm election, making health care their top policy 
objective.  
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One of the ads Red and Gold ran attacked Martha McSally on her stance towards health 
care. Martha McSally allowed health care insurance companies to charge adults over the age of 
50 five times as much for insurance as they charge adults under the age of 50.316 This caused 
mounting health care bills, making retirement for some unaffordable.317 Red and Gold PAC 
spent approx. $1.6 million in ad buys targeting McSally’s position on health care costs and 
McSally’s push to eliminate Obama Care.318 Democrats, through dark money groups, have spent 
a total of $3.46 – $4 million on health care ads.319 The one mentioned above is one of many ads 
blitzing Arizona’s airwaves ahead of their midterm election.  
 The 2018 Midterm Election cycle became the outlier for election spending because not 
only did liberal groups outspend their conservative counterparts, but dark money groups also 
outspent the candidate they backed. As noted earlier, dark money groups run negative and 
deceptive ads and this blurs the line between the messages voters receive. Voters do not know if 
those messages are from the candidate him or herself, the interest group disclosing their 
spending, or dark money group not disclosing their spending.  
For the 2018 Midterm Elections, negative ads increased exponentially from outside 
groups. In the 2018 Midterm Elections negative ads accounted for 61% of total ads aired.320 This 
broke down to 48% of the ads coded as, “purely negative,” and 21% of the ads coded as, 
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“contrast.”321 Wesleyan Media Project reports Democratic dark money groups dominated the 
2018 Midterms with 41% of ads coming from groups that do not disclose donors.322 Negative 
advertising produced by dark money groups are 9% more persuasive than ads produced by the 
candidate him or herself.323 Unknown interest groups are more persuasive because voters do not 
connect the ad to the candidate whom they perceive as, “self – serving politician.”324 Negative 
ads and deceptive ads work in favor towards the candidate by eliminating the, “backlash 
effect.”325 When a candidate’s campaign produce a negative ad, voters connect the negative ad to 
the candidate, causing the voter to draw negative conclusions of about them.326 These negative 
conclusions cause voters to withdraw support for the candidate.327 Dark money groups, eliminate 
the link voters make between the candidate and the interest group. When voters cannot link the 
two, they are less likely to hold elected officials accountable, therefore; it’s in the best interest of 
the candidate to have a dark money group produce the ads.328 
Negative ads produced by dark money group not only remove the link between the 
candidate and the voter, but also remove accountability between the candidate and the voter. 
Candidates are discouraged from sponsoring negative ads out of fear voters would hold the 
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candidate accountable to the ad.329 By having a, “campaign surrogate,” (outside group), run the 
ad, the voter cannot hold the candidate accountable.330 Accountability and transparency are 
removed for voters when outside groups, specifically dark money groups, become responsible 
for advertising on behalf of the candidate. This has been possible due to relaxed campaign 
finance laws allowing money to flow from corporations to interest groups to candidates freely, 
causing transparency and accountability amongst the electorate and candidates to dissolve.   
Discussion: 
Negative advertising by outside groups has only been effective because of Citizens 
United. Citizens United allowed wealthy corporations and interest groups to donate in unlimited 
sums to elect their preferred candidate into office. One of the ways interest groups and 
corporations do this is through the use of media advertisements and these advertisements did not 
have to be positive. The Citizens United ruling allowed advertisements to appear on tv thirty 
days before a primary election and sixty days prior to a general election, in an attempt to 
influence voter during an election cycle. Citizens United altered the campaign finance structure 
to favor economic elites, and organized business interests, over mass – based interest groups and 
the average citizens.331 This proved to be a problem because Citizens United encouraged the, 
“growth of shadow part[ies],” and these were in the form of 501c (4) groups.332 These 501 c (4) 
groups were called social welfare groups, and did not have to disclose their donors or to whom 
they were contributing money. Donating behind a veil of secrecy allows dark money groups to 
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avoid repercussions from voters, while at the same time, controlling the electoral outcomes.333 
By hiding behind a veil of secrecy dark money groups remove the link and accountability 
between the candidate, the donor and the electorate. This has permitted not only conservative 
dark money groups from influencing an election, but also liberal dark money groups. The dark 
money problem had been brewing for some time, and Citizens United proved the issue was just 
going to (and is) getting worse each election cycle. Conservative dark money groups increased 
their election spending in 2012 outspending liberal dark money groups. Conservative dark 
money spending was aimed at Barack Obama’s health care plan and planting doubt in the 
electorate’s minds about Barack Obama’s second term in office. Obama won the 2012 
presidential election; however, this did not stop dark money groups from operating and realizing 
they could use secrecy to influence close election cycles. In the 2018 Midterm Elections, 
specifically in Arizona, liberal dark money groups outspent conservative dark money groups. 
Liberal groups ran negative attack ads against Martha McSally in an attempt to elect Democrat 
Kyrsten Sinema.  Kyrsten Sinema won the Senate seat in Arizona, showing dark money spending 
is not a partisan issue. Dark money allows both conservatives and liberal groups to evade 
transparency and donate in unlimited sums to elect their preferred candidate into office. This has 
only been possible due the Supreme Court striking down campaign finance laws on the basis 
they violate freedom of speech.  
Conclusion: 
 Campaign finance laws ensures the electoral process of campaigning, running for office, 
and voting balances the interests of the candidate, the donor, and the electorate. Campaign 
finance laws restricting contributions, spending, and political advertising keep money and votes 
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separate. Money remains in the economic sphere, votes remain in the political sphere and 
campaign finance laws discourage incumbents and challengers from catering to those with 
wealth and influence, over those who do not. Campaign finance reform becomes a balancing act 
between the equality of citizens on one side, and the inequality of resources (money) on the 
other. Campaign finance laws correct the wealth disparities in political participation caused by 
large sums of money entering the political system. Campaign finance laws meant to restrict the 
amount of money an individual can contribute by setting contribution limits, limits on using 
candidate personal funds, and spending limits were ruled unconstitutional in the Supreme Court 
case Buckley V. Valeo. This court case had unintended negative consequences such as, allowing 
the incumbent to accumulate money quickly, PAC contributions rose, donations shifted to soft 
money, donors influenced a specific lawmaker with the intent he or she will receive something in 
return, and the emergence of, “secret gifts,” what is now called dark money. These theoretical 
frameworks suggest, curtailed campaign finance laws permitted dark money groups to reduce 
transparency of political information, thereby causing negative and deceptive political 
advertisements to increase during an election cycle. 
 Dark money entering the electoral process resulted from the Supreme Court in the conical 
case Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission ruled corporations, interest groups and unions could use money from their general 
treasury to directly elect their preferred candidate into office. Corporations, unions and interest 
groups could air media advertisements that directly advocate for a candidate of their choice and 
air these advertisements up and till Election Day. The Supreme Court ruled a corporation, union, 
and interest group has a right to use money as a form of political speech, effectively ruling 
money is a form of free speech. Furthermore, the Supreme Court gave corporations, unions and 




interest groups the same freedom of speech protections as individuals under the Constitution. 
This opened the floodgate for unlimited money to enter the electoral system.  
 One of the ways money entered the electoral system was through 501 c (4) groups, social 
welfare organizations.  In an effort to skirt tax laws, these organizations use PAC’s and Super 
PACs to make political expenditures. Furthermore, these 501 c (4)’s do not have to disclose their 
donors or to whom they are donating to. Hence, the term dark money groups. These dark money 
groups are active in election cycles, specifically the 2012 Presidential Election and 2018 
Midterm Elections. In the 2012 Presidential Election conservative dark money groups outspent 
liberal dark money groups, in an attempt to block Barack Obama’s health care plan. The dark 
money group operating during the 2012 Presidential Election was, “Americans for Prosperity.” 
Americans for Prosperity blitzed the airwaves with negative and deceptive ads showing how a 
universal health care system would harm Americans receiving care, comparing the U.S health 
care system to Europe’s. Although Obama won in 2012, dark money groups were just beginning 
to pour money into election cycles.  
 The 2018 Midterm Election marked the highest amount of dark money group spending 
since Citizens United with liberal groups outspending conservative groups. The liberal group 
operating in the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona was Majority Forward. Majority Forward 
sough to unseat Republican Senator in Arizona, Martha McSally and elect Democrat Kyrsten 
Sinema. Majority Forward waged negative ad campaigns against McSally’s push to eliminate 
Obama Care and hike insurance rates for older Americans. Majority Forward’s candidate 
Kyrsten Sinema won the 2018 election in Arizona. However, it was not without negative 
advertising and funneling money between PACs and Super PACs to elect their preferred 
candidate. Dark money is a problem on both sides of the aisle; Democrats and Republicans. 




Citizens United allowed dark money groups to operate, reducing transparency of political 
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         Conclusion  
The first chapter of the thesis concluded, interest groups who have money (collecting 
membership dues or donations), are well established, occupy highly politicalized industries, i.e., 
gun rights, abortion, and gay marriage and identify as partisan will prefer an electoral donation 
strategy as opposed to an access-oriented donation strategy. This chapter uses the National Rifle 
Association to demonstrate an interest group with money, that is well established, occupies a 
highly politicalized industry, and identifies as partisan must back a candidate that aligns 
ideologically with them to influence the electoral process. Likewise, these interest groups tend to 
have access to the legislative process, so their goal is to simply win seats.  
Moreover, the second chapter uses Citizens United to conclude, as campaign spending on 
issue advertisements increases, the quantity of issues discussed decreases, causing a polarized 
electorate. The second chapter uses two election cycles to demonstrate polarization increased 
from 2008 to 2016 due to the sheer amount of money entering the electoral system as a result of 
Citizens United. Moreover, the 2008 Presidential Election occurring before Citizens United to 
demonstrate polarization within the electorate was not due to media advertisements, but due to 
the changing electorate. In 2008, the electorate was younger, the electorate was racially diverse, 
supported progressive issues such as, government health care, pulling troops out of Iraq, and 
pulling the economy out of the recession. Barack Obama not only connected with this younger 




and more racially diverse electorate, but he championed the progressive issues they supported. 
Barack Obama chose to use private campaign money (contributions from individuals, labor 
unions and PACs) to fund his campaign. He used those private campaign contributions to fund 
his own campaign advertisements, giving him the control of the message and content of the ad. 
Hence, interest groups did not have to produce ads on his behalf. Likewise, interest groups 
focused their attention on Democratic Congressional races, instead of Barack Obama’s 
campaign.  
 This was not the case for the 2016 Presidential Election where interest groups in the form 
of political action committee (PACs) poured large sums of money into media advertisements to 
elect Donald Trump. The PAC supporting Donald Trump, the Great America PAC, produced an 
ad that compared and contrasted Hillary Clinton’s handling of the Benghazi attack with Donald 
Trump’s support for troops serving overseas. The ad showed Hillary Clinton’s handling of the 
attack as a, “disgrace,” and showed how Donald Trump is, “accountable and truthful,” to the 
American people. This ad replayed multiple times prior to and on Election Day, influencing 
voter opinions.  
Not only did PACs run ads, but Donald Trump’s campaign ran an ad comparing and 
contrasting Hillary Clinton’s immigration policies to his own immigration policies. This ad 
showed Hillary Clinton’s immigration policies as, “dangerous, unsafe, amnesty for criminals,” 
but Donald Trump’s immigration policies as, “safe, criminals kept out, the border secure.” This 
ad replayed multiple, if not hundreds of times, prior to and on Election Day. Combined these two 
ads reinforced the opinions of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump; either voters hated Hillary 
Clinton and loved Donald Trump, or they hated Donald Trump and loved Hillary Clinton. 
Hence, the middle ground of voters disappeared, leaving two extreme ends of the political 




spectrum. Citizens United changed the landscape of political advertising, allowing interest 
groups to pour money into advertisements that explicitly advocated for the defeat of a candidate, 
these advertisements repeated multiple times, thus pushing voters to extreme ends of the political 
spectrum. 
These advertisements polarized the electorate not only because of the timing of the ads, 
but the sheer amount of money from undisclosed donors pouring into the ads during an election 
cycle. The third chapter uses the Citizens United decision to conclude, curtailed campaign 
finance laws permitted dark money groups to reduce transparency of political information, 
causing negative and deceptive political advertisements to increase during an election cycle. The 
third chapter uses two election cycles: the 2012 Presidential Election and 2018 Midterm Election 
in Arizona to show the impact dark money has on issue advertisements and the electorate.  
The 2012 Presidential Election demonstrated conservative dark money groups outspent 
liberal dark money groups, in an attempt to block Barack Obama’s health care plan, the 
Affordable Health Care Act. The dark money group operating during the 2012 Presidential 
Election was, “Americans for Prosperity.” Americans for Prosperity ran an ad comparing breast 
cancer survival rates in Europe under a government run health care system, and breast cancer 
survival rates in the United States under private insurance. The ad shows the survival rate 
decreasing in Europe due to their government run health care system. However, the ad shows the 
survival rate increasing in the United States due to private insurance companies. The ad depicts a 
woman who claims if she were in Europe and receiving care, she would have died. The ad 
misled voters because the actual survival rates in both countries remained steady. Americans for 
Prosperity donated to a front group who then produced issue ads on behalf of Americans for 




Prosperity. The voter watching the ad, does not know who funded the ad, or how much money 
was spent on it.  
Although Obama won the 2012 Presidential Election, dark money groups were just 
beginning to ramp up their operations for the 2018 Midterm Election in Arizona. The 2018 
Midterm Election saw the highest amount of dark money spending since Citizens United. 
Furthermore, the 2018 Midterm Election saw liberal dark money groups outspent conservative 
dark money groups. The dark money group operating during the 2018 Midterm Election in 
Arizona was “Majority Forward.”  Majority Forward and its affiliate PAC, Senate Majority PAC, 
blitzed the airwaves with issue ads critiquing Republican Senator Martha McSally. The ads 
critiqued McSally’s push to end the Affordable Health Care Act and hike insurance rates for 
those over the age of 50. Majority Forward ran these issue ads in attempt to elect the Democratic 
Senator Kyrsten Sinema.  
Majority Forward succeed in electing Kyrsten Sinema by spending millions of dollars on 
issue ads. Since Majority Forward is a dark money group, they can run issue ads without 
disclosing who funded the ad or disclose to the FEC how much money was spent on the ad. Dark 
money groups remove the link between the electorate and the donor by decreasing transparency 
of political information. Dark money groups have only increased their spending since Citizens 
United. Likewise, Citizens United permitted corporations and interest groups to donate in 
unlimited sums to elect their preferred candidate by running advertisements. These ads skewed 
negative and appeared on televisions on Election Day influencing voter opinions at the ballot 
box.   
The impact of Citizens United not only affected electoral outcomes during the 2012, 
2016, and 2018 elections, but also affected transparency of political information transmitted to 




voters in the form of media advertisements. Money in the electoral system is a double - edged 
sword; it communicates the candidate’s message across the airwaves to voters. However, money 
left unregulated harms the exact process the United States Constitution and the United States 
Supreme Court protects, the right to vote. With Citizens United, the Supreme Court elevated the 
Constitutional rights of the wealthy few (the minority), and drowned out the voices of the 
majority (We the People of the United States), by glancing the other way as money pours in from 
PACs, Super PACs, and dark money groups. By the same token, curtailed campaign finance laws 
cause interest groups to prefer an electoral donation strategy as opposed to an access – oriented 
strategy, cause an increase in spending on issue ads polarizing the electorate, and cause dark 
money groups to decrease transparency of political information during an election cycle.  
Based on the findings of these three chapters, the lack of campaign finance laws is here to 
stay. Combined these chapters show the consequences of relaxed campaign finance laws, not 
only for the electorate, but on the quantity of issues discussed and the transmission of political 
information during an election cycle. Likewise, campaign finance laws regarding spending, 
raising, and donating were struck down by the Supreme Court on the basis they violated the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled time and time again, First Amendment protections were 
more important than a non - affluent voter’s right to participate in the electoral process. 
Furthermore, free speech becomes the basis for striking down important campaign finance laws 
meant to protect the electorate’s voice in the political process. These important provisions were 
struck down in Buckley V. Valeo and the final straw being, Citizens United V. Federal Election 
Commission, which opened the flood gates for money to enter the electoral system. The Supreme 
Court is ideally supposed to protect the rights of individuals by upholding the Constitution. 
However, in this case the Supreme Court sided with the wealthy corporate interests, above the 




electorate’s interest. The Supreme Court established campaign finance laws as a violation to First 
Amendment rights, setting the precedent for future reforms to fail. Hence, once the genie is out 
of the bottle, it’s hard to put it back in and reverse what has been established.  
Based on the findings the following recommendations include, tighter restrictions on 
campaign finance spending, restrictions on the use of soft money, and more transparency of 
political information. Some of those reforms include; public funding of campaigns, a voucher 
program, and the current bill moving through the Senate, H.R 1. Public funding of campaigns 
requires candidates to accept spending limits, in exchange, the candidate receives a subsidy from 
the U.S Treasury.334 These limits do not harm the free speech rights of the candidate, and this 
reform is less drastic than direct regulation (spending and raising limits).335 Public funding 
incentivizes candidates to cater to non – wealthy small donors for support.336 Moreover, small 
donors are representative of the majority of the electorate.337 When small donors finance 
elections, candidates can raise and spend what they need to compete with super PACs.338 Under 
the public financing system, there are no limits on political spending, so it stands up to the 
current Supreme Court requirements for financing elections.339 The public funding system is a 
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less drastic measure to regulate money in the electoral system because the, “quantity of speech 
lost from candidates is no different than if those same limits were imposed directly.”340 Hence, 
the public funding of campaigns does not harm limits on speech any more than limits that 
already exist on political speech.  
Although public financing has its benefits, there are drawbacks. Candidates spend more 
time on fundraising, not less. Even if public financing of campaigns remains high, there is a 
competitive advantage for candidates to fundraise independently from receiving public funds 
(private contributions).341 The myth of public funding is it replaces spending limits. The public 
funding system does not replace spending limits.342 The public financing of campaigns is in 
addition to spending limits.343 With that being said, candidates can refuse to accept the public 
funds. Public financing of campaigns causes a candidate facing well – funded opponents to 
decline the spending limits attached to the public financing system, thus opt in to private 
donations.344 Hence, Barack Obama, opted in to private donations instead of the public financing 
system. Lastly, the public financing system is not likely to materialize due to the explosion of 
PACs and their ability to support a candidate quickly through soft money.345 
Similarly, another reform gaining traction is the voucher program. Voting age Americans 
are given a voucher usable for contributions to candidates, parties or candidate committees. The 
voucher program determines which candidate qualifies for public funding, and how much does 
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each candidate receive.346 The voucher program gives large sums of money to registered voters 
and regular voters who participated in the primary and general election. Voters can then donate 
this money to a candidate, party or candidate committee.347 The voucher program encourages 
voters to participate in civic life.348 The voucher program solves the question of what candidate 
gets money and how much by asking the voters to make those decisions. Instead of the 
government setting the funding thresholds, the voters individually decide which candidate 
receives their voucher.349 Likewise, the voter decides how much public money each candidate 
receives. The voucher program gives Americans an equal say in funding decisions and increases 
political participation of the electorate.  
The voucher system also has its set of drawbacks, making it hard to pass through 
Congress. The first drawback is uncertainty. Candidates depend on the vouchers given to them 
by the voters, but what if voter turnout is low? If voter turnout is low, then the dollar amount of 
vouchers the candidate receives is low.350 This tilts the playing field to favor candidates coming 
into the race with money, mainly the incumbent. This excludes challengers who do not want to 
enter the race given the uncertain distribution of the vouchers on Election Day.351  
The second drawback is vouchers reward early popularity, hence the incumbent. 
Unknown candidates have a harder time entering the race because incumbents have the 
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advantage of name recognition and money over the challenger.352 Moreover, voters have an 
incentive to give their voucher to the incumbent, not the challenger.  
Similarly, the final drawback is vouchers fail to promote candidate equality. Vouchers 
allow the incumbent to stay ahead because voters will give their vouchers to the well-known 
candidate.353 Furthermore, there is no guarantee candidates will receive equal funding from the 
vouchers. Vouchers also require candidates to focus on fundraising by pitching for money and 
votes from the electorate at the same time.354 The problem then becomes it’s a scramble for 
resources and votes similar to what is currently in place.  
Bringing campaign finance reform to the current day, the House of Representatives and 
the Senate received a bill entitled, “For the People Act,” (H.R 1). For reference, For the People 
Act of 2021 guarantees disclosure of contributions by requiring organizations involved in 
political activity (501 c (4)’s dark money groups) to disclose their donors. H.R 1 also creates a 
dollar-for-dollar matching system for small contributions given to political candidates.355 This 
matching system would implement a 6 to 1 matching of small dollar contributions.356 H.R 1 
would also prohibit super PAC and candidate coordination, create new rules for political ads 
appearing online, and end dark money from entering the political system.357 H.R 1 also puts 
Congress back in the driver seat; Congress regains the authority to regulate money in politics, 
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reinstating campaign finance laws repealed in Citizens United. H.R 1 strengthens oversight of 
campaign finance laws, specifically on super PACs and reorganizes the Federal Election 
Commission to enhance enforcement mechanisms for campaign finance violations.358 Put 
simply, H.R 1 raises the voice of the public over the voices of the wealthy/ powerful.359 H.R 1’s 
intention was to prevent large sums of money from entering the electoral system and improving 
transparency. H.R 1 passed the House of Representatives, but it did not pass the Senate.   
These chapters explore a piece of the campaign finance reform puzzle; interest groups, 
issue advertisements, and dark money, but there are other areas of campaign finance reform that 
have yet to be explored. These areas include: do campaign contributions negatively or positively 
influence Congressional races in heavily contested seats? Does a matching program (matching 
dollar for dollar) donations decrease the corrupt behavior of politicians and interest groups? Does 
a voucher system work to equalize the playing field between the electorate, the donor and the 
candidate? Has the impact of a voucher program been studied and implemented in other 
countries or other smaller scale United States cities/ counties?  
Similarly, these thesis chapters raise questions about voter turnout and participation. Do 
these issue advertisements negatively or positively affect voter turnout or participation prior to 
an election? Do voters with higher or lower education attainment believe negative/ deceptive 
issue ads or do they question the ad and come to their own conclusions? What is the effect of 
money and issue ads (negative and deceptive) on voter apathy?  Given H.R 1 did not pass in the 
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Senate, is it possible legislatively to reverse the effects of Citizens United? And finally, does 
money increase voter efficacy in the political process or decrease voter efficacy in the political 
process? Raising these normative questions will encourage the reader to not only explore other 
areas of campaign finance reform, but give the reader a comprehensive understanding of 
campaign finance reforms in the United States and how these reforms have been scaled back to 
favor the wealthy corporations over the non – affluent voter’s right to participate in the electoral 
process.  
Collectively this thesis explores three aspects of campaign finance reform: interest group 
donation strategies, campaign contributions and their effect on issue advertisements, and the 
impact of dark money on transparency of political information. Exploring these three aspects, 
and asking normative questions will give the reader a comprehensive understanding of campaign 
finance reforms in the United States and encourage further research and reform in the area of 
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